[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.1 37/53] cifs: fix potential memory leaks in session setup

From: Sasha Levin
Date: Mon Jan 16 2023 - 09:07:24 EST


From: Paulo Alcantara <pc@xxxxxx>

[ Upstream commit 2fe58d977ee05da5bb89ef5dc4f5bf2dc15db46f ]

Make sure to free cifs_ses::auth_key.response before allocating it as
we might end up leaking memory in reconnect or mounting.

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@xxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 1 +
fs/cifs/sess.c | 2 ++
fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
index 5db73c0f792a..cbc18b4a9cb2 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
* ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) +
* unicode length of a netbios domain name
*/
+ kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen;
ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
diff --git a/fs/cifs/sess.c b/fs/cifs/sess.c
index 0b842a07e157..c47b254f0d1e 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/sess.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c
@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@ int decode_ntlmssp_challenge(char *bcc_ptr, int blob_len,
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tilen) {
+ kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(bcc_ptr + tioffset, tilen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
@@ -1428,6 +1429,7 @@ sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data)
goto out_put_spnego_key;
}

+ kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(msg->data, msg->sesskey_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
index a5695748a89b..d5a0eb2c0a1d 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -1450,6 +1450,7 @@ SMB2_auth_kerberos(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)

/* keep session key if binding */
if (!is_binding) {
+ kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(msg->data, msg->sesskey_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
--
2.35.1