Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM

[Sean Christopherson]

On Tue, Jan 24, 2023, Liam Merwick wrote:
> On 14/01/2023 00:37, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 02, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
> > > This patch series implements KVM guest private memory for confidential
> > > computing scenarios like Intel TDX[1]. If a TDX host accesses
> > > TDX-protected guest memory, machine check can happen which can further
> > > crash the running host system, this is terrible for multi-tenant
> > > configurations. The host accesses include those from KVM userspace like
> > > QEMU. This series addresses KVM userspace induced crash by introducing
> > > new mm and KVM interfaces so KVM userspace can still manage guest memory
> > > via a fd-based approach, but it can never access the guest memory
> > > content.
> > > 
> > > The patch series touches both core mm and KVM code. I appreciate
> > > Andrew/Hugh and Paolo/Sean can review and pick these patches. Any other
> > > reviews are always welcome.
> > >    - 01: mm change, target for mm tree
> > >    - 02-09: KVM change, target for KVM tree
> > 
> > A version with all of my feedback, plus reworked versions of Vishal's selftest,
> > is available here:
> > 
> >    git@xxxxxxxxxx:sean-jc/linux.git x86/upm_base_support
> > 
> > It compiles and passes the selftest, but it's otherwise barely tested.  There are
> > a few todos (2 I think?) and many of the commits need changelogs, i.e. it's still
> > a WIP.
> > 
> 
> When running LTP (https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp) on the v10
> bits (and also with Sean's branch above) I encounter the following NULL
> pointer dereference with testcases/kernel/syscalls/madvise/madvise01
> (100% reproducible).
> 
> It appears that in restrictedmem_error_page() inode->i_mapping->private_data
> is NULL
> in the list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list)
> but I don't know why.

Kirill, can you take a look?  Or pass the buck to someone who can? :-)