RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Date: Thu Feb 09 2023 - 12:29:22 EST
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx> Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 7:10 AM
>
> On 2/7/23 16:18, Michael Kelley (LINUX) wrote:
> > In v2 of this patch series, you had concerns about CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR being too
> > generic. [1] After some back-and-forth discussion in this thread, Boris is back to
> > preferring it. Can you live with CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR? Just trying to reach
> > consensus ...
>
> I still think it's too generic. Even the comment was trying to be too
> generic:
>
> > + /**
> > + * @CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR: Guest VM is running with a paravisor
> > + *
> > + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with
> > + * a paravisor in VMPL0. Having a paravisor affects things
> > + * like whether the I/O APIC is emulated and operates in the
> > + * encrypted or decrypted portion of the guest physical address
> > + * space.
> > + *
> > + * Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM.
> > + */
> > + CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR,
>
> This doesn't help me figure out when I should use CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR
> really at all. It "operates in the encrypted or decrypted portion..."
> Which one is it? Should I be adding or removing encryption on the
> mappings for paravisors?
>
> That's opposed to:
>
> > + /**
> > + * @CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED: Guest VM IO-APIC is encrypted
> > + *
> > + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with
> > + * an IO-APIC that is emulated by a paravisor running in the
> > + * guest VM context. As such, the IO-APIC is accessed in the
> > + * encrypted portion of the guest physical address space.
> > + *
> > + * Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM.
> > + */
> > + CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED,
>
> Which makes this code almost stupidly obvious:
>
> > - flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
> > + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED))
> > + flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
>
> "Oh, if it's access is not encrypted, then get the decrypted version of
> the flags."
>
> Compare that to:
>
> if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR))
> flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
>
> Which is a big fat WTF. Because a paravisor "operates in the encrypted
> or decrypted portion..." So is this if() condition correct or inverted?
> It's utterly impossible to tell because of how generic the option is.
>
> The only way to make sense of the generic thing is to do:
>
> /* Paravisors have a decrypted IO-APIC mapping: */
> if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR))
> flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
>
> at every site to state the assumption and make the connection between
> paravisors and the behavior. If you want to go do _that_, then fine by
> me. But, at that point, the naming is pretty worthless because you
> could also have said "goldfish" instead of "paravisor" and it makes an
> equal amount of sense:
>
> /* Goldfish have a decrypted IO-APIC mapping: */
> if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GOLDFISH))
> flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
>
> I get it, naming is hard.
Boris --
Any further comments? Trying to reach consensus. A
solution aligned with Dave's arguments would keep the current
CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED, and add
CC_ATTR_ACCESS_TPM_ENCRYPTED to cover the TPM case,
which decouples the two.
Yes, naming is hard. Reaching consensus on naming is even
harder. :-)
Michael