[PATCH v2 10/10] fortify: Improve buffer overflow reporting
From: Kees Cook
Date: Fri Apr 07 2023 - 15:27:58 EST
Improve the reporting of buffer overflows under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE to
help accelerate debugging efforts. The calculations are all just sitting
in registers anyway, so pass them along to the function to be reported.
For example, before:
detected buffer overflow in memcpy
and after:
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4096 byte read from buffer of size 1
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 2 +-
include/linux/fortify-string.h | 61 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
lib/fortify_kunit.c | 4 +--
lib/string_helpers.c | 9 ++---
5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c
index f31e2c949089..5487f64d8c3d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p,
putstr(" done, booting the kernel.\n");
}
-void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason)
+void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, size_t avail, size_t size)
{
error("detected buffer overflow");
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
index aa45e7529a40..c1dc12abd6d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
return output + entry_offset;
}
-void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason)
+void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, size_t avail, size_t size)
{
error("detected buffer overflow");
}
diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
index 5d04c0e95854..a0002740d2a7 100644
--- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
+++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
#ifdef FORTIFY_KUNIT_OVERRIDE
# define fortify_panic kunit_fortify_panic
#else
-# define fortify_panic(func, write, retfail) \
- __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write))
+# define fortify_panic(func, write, avail, size, retfail) \
+ __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write), avail, size)
#endif
#define FORTIFY_READ 0
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ enum fortify_func {
EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC)
};
-void __fortify_report(const u8 reason);
-void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) __cold __noreturn;
+void __fortify_report(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size);
+void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size) __cold __noreturn;
void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)");
void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__write_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, p);
return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
}
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size
/* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */
ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
return __underlying_strlen(p);
ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
if (p_size <= ret)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -298,8 +298,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, si
__write_overflow();
}
if (size) {
- if (len >= p_size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, q_len);
+ if (p_size <= len)
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, len + 1, q_len);
__underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
p[len] = '\0';
}
@@ -376,8 +376,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s
* Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than
* p_size.
*/
- if (len > p_size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, -E2BIG);
+ if (p_size < len)
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, len, -E2BIG);
/*
* We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
/* Give up if string is already overflowed. */
if (p_size <= p_len)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, wanted);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, p_len + 1, wanted);
if (actual >= avail) {
copy_len = avail - p_len - 1;
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
/* Give up if copy will overflow. */
if (p_size <= actual)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, wanted);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, actual + 1, wanted);
__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
p[actual] = '\0';
@@ -471,9 +471,11 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
{
const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
+ size_t wanted;
- if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
+ wanted = strlcat(p, q, p_size);
+ if (p_size <= wanted)
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, wanted + 1, p);
return p;
}
@@ -502,14 +504,15 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun
{
const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
const size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
- size_t p_len, copy_len;
+ size_t p_len, copy_len, total;
if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
p_len = strlen(p);
copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
- if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
+ total = p_len + copy_len + 1;
+ if (p_size < total)
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, total, p);
__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
return p;
@@ -550,7 +553,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
* lengths are unknown.)
*/
if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, true);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true);
return false;
}
@@ -650,9 +653,9 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
* lengths are unknown.)
*/
if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, true);
+ fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true);
else if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size)
- fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, true);
+ fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, true);
/*
* Warn when writing beyond destination field size.
@@ -752,7 +755,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL);
return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
}
@@ -768,8 +771,10 @@ int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t
if (__compiletime_lessthan(q_size, size))
__read_overflow2();
}
- if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, INT_MIN);
+ if (p_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, INT_MIN);
+ else if (q_size < size)
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, q_size, size, INT_MIN);
return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
}
@@ -781,7 +786,7 @@ void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL);
return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
}
@@ -793,7 +798,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL);
return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
}
@@ -806,7 +811,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp
if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size))
__read_overflow();
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, NULL);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL);
return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
}
@@ -843,7 +848,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
__write_overflow();
/* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */
if (p_size < size)
- fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p);
+ fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, p);
__underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
return p;
}
diff --git a/lib/fortify_kunit.c b/lib/fortify_kunit.c
index 3206fe723110..6aac58eb6eb6 100644
--- a/lib/fortify_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/fortify_kunit.c
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@
/* Call kunit_fortify_panic() instead of fortify_panic() */
#define FORTIFY_KUNIT_OVERRIDE
void fortify_add_kunit_error(int write);
-#define kunit_fortify_panic(func, write, retfail) \
+#define kunit_fortify_panic(func, write, avail, size, retfail) \
do { \
- __fortify_report(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)); \
+ __fortify_report(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write), avail, size); \
fortify_add_kunit_error(write); \
return (retfail); \
} while (0)
diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c
index 38edde20e61b..9a8167535e1f 100644
--- a/lib/string_helpers.c
+++ b/lib/string_helpers.c
@@ -1029,20 +1029,21 @@ static const char * const fortify_func_name[] = {
EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC_NAME)
};
-void __fortify_report(const u8 reason)
+void __fortify_report(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size)
{
const u8 func = FORTIFY_REASON_FUNC(reason);
const bool write = FORTIFY_REASON_DIR(reason);
const char *name;
name = fortify_func_name[min_t(u8, func, FORTIFY_FUNC_UNKNOWN)];
- WARN(1, "%s: detected buffer %s overflow\n", name, str_read_write(!write));
+ WARN(1, "%s: detected buffer overflow: %zu byte %s buffer of size %zu\n",
+ name, size, str_read_write(!write), avail);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_report);
-void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason)
+void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size)
{
- __fortify_report(reason);
+ __fortify_report(reason, avail, size);
BUG();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_panic);
--
2.34.1