[RFC PATCH v2 05/11] x86/bugs: Use Virtual MSRs to request hardware mitigations
From: Chao Gao
Date: Fri Apr 14 2023 - 02:27:48 EST
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Guests that have different family/model than the host may not be aware
of hardware mitigations(such as RRSBA_DIS_S) available on host. This is
particularly true when guests migrate. To solve this problem Intel
processors have added a virtual MSR interface through which guests can
report their mitigation status and request VMM to deploy relevant
hardware mitigations.
Use this virtualized MSR interface to request relevant hardware controls
for retpoline mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Jiaan Lu <jiaan.lu@xxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 60b25d87b82c..aec213f0c6fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@
* IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR
* supported
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_VIRTUAL_ENUM BIT_ULL(63) /* MSR_VIRTUAL_ENUMERATION supported */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
@@ -1103,6 +1104,30 @@
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_INTEL_PT (1ULL << 14)
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_VMWRITE_SHADOW_RO_FIELDS (1ULL << 29)
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_SCALE 0x1F
+
+/* Intel virtual MSRs */
+#define MSR_VIRTUAL_ENUMERATION 0x50000000
+#define VIRT_ENUM_MITIGATION_CTRL_SUPPORT BIT(0) /*
+ * Mitigation ctrl via virtual
+ * MSRs supported
+ */
+
+#define MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_ENUM 0x50000001
+#define MITI_ENUM_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_SUPPORT BIT(0) /* VMM supports BHI_DIS_S */
+#define MITI_ENUM_RETPOLINE_S_SUPPORT BIT(1) /* VMM supports RRSBA_DIS_S */
+
+#define MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_CTRL 0x50000002
+#define MITI_CTRL_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_USED_BIT 0 /*
+ * Request VMM to deploy
+ * BHI_DIS_S mitigation
+ */
+#define MITI_CTRL_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_USED BIT(MITI_CTRL_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_USED_BIT)
+#define MITI_CTRL_RETPOLINE_S_USED_BIT 1 /*
+ * Request VMM to deploy
+ * RRSBA_DIS_S mitigation
+ */
+#define MITI_CTRL_RETPOLINE_S_USED BIT(MITI_CTRL_RETPOLINE_S_USED_BIT)
+
/* AMD-V MSRs */
#define MSR_VM_CR 0xc0010114
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index f9d060e71c3e..5326c03d9d5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1435,6 +1435,27 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
dump_stack();
}
+/* Speculation control using virtualized MSRs */
+static void spec_ctrl_setup_virtualized_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 msr_virt_enum, msr_mitigation_enum;
+
+ /* When retpoline is being used, request relevant hardware controls */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
+ return;
+
+ if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_VIRTUAL_ENUM))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_VIRTUAL_ENUMERATION, msr_virt_enum);
+ if (!(msr_virt_enum & VIRT_ENUM_MITIGATION_CTRL_SUPPORT))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_ENUM, msr_mitigation_enum);
+ if (msr_mitigation_enum & MITI_ENUM_RETPOLINE_S_SUPPORT)
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_VIRTUAL_MITIGATION_CTRL, MITI_CTRL_RETPOLINE_S_USED_BIT);
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -1546,6 +1567,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+ spec_ctrl_setup_virtualized_msr();
+
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
@@ -2115,6 +2138,8 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+
+ spec_ctrl_setup_virtualized_msr();
}
bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
--
2.40.0