[PATCH net-next 6/8] crypto: af_alg: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES

[David Howells]

Make AF_ALG sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES.  This causes pages to be
spliced from the source iterator.

This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle
multiple multipage folios in a single transaction.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@xxxxxxxxxx>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@xxxxxxxxx>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
cc: linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
 crypto/af_alg.c         | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 crypto/algif_aead.c     | 22 +++++++++++-----------
 crypto/algif_skcipher.c |  8 ++++----
 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index 17ecaae50af7..979033600185 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -940,6 +940,10 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
 	bool init = false;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) &&
+	    !iov_iter_is_bvec(&msg->msg_iter))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (msg->msg_controllen) {
 		err = af_alg_cmsg_send(msg, &con);
 		if (err)
@@ -985,7 +989,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
 	while (size) {
 		struct scatterlist *sg;
 		size_t len = size;
-		size_t plen;
+		ssize_t plen;
 
 		/* use the existing memory in an allocated page */
 		if (ctx->merge) {
@@ -1030,7 +1034,27 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
 		if (sgl->cur)
 			sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl->cur - 1);
 
-		if (1 /* TODO check MSG_SPLICE_PAGES */) {
+		if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) {
+			struct sg_table sgtable = {
+				.sgl		= sg,
+				.nents		= sgl->cur,
+				.orig_nents	= sgl->cur,
+			};
+
+			plen = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, len, &sgtable,
+						  MAX_SGL_ENTS, 0);
+			if (plen < 0) {
+				err = plen;
+				goto unlock;
+			}
+
+			for (; sgl->cur < sgtable.nents; sgl->cur++)
+				get_page(sg_page(&sg[sgl->cur]));
+			len -= plen;
+			ctx->used += plen;
+			copied += plen;
+			size -= plen;
+		} else {
 			do {
 				struct page *pg;
 				unsigned int i = sgl->cur;
diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c
index f6aa3856d8d5..b16111a3025a 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
  * The following concept of the memory management is used:
  *
  * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is
- * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling
- * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be
+ * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage. Filling up
+ * the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be
  * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must
  * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL.
  *
@@ -113,19 +113,19 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage that has not
-	 * yet been processed.
+	 * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg that has not yet been
+	 * processed.
 	 */
 	used = ctx->used;
 
 	/*
-	 * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is
-	 * also present in sendmsg/sendpage. The checks in sendpage/sendmsg
-	 * shall provide an information to the data sender that something is
-	 * wrong, but they are irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity.
-	 * We need this check here too in case user space decides to not honor
-	 * the error message in sendmsg/sendpage and still call recvmsg. This
-	 * check here protects the kernel integrity.
+	 * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is also
+	 * present in sendmsg. The checks in sendmsg shall provide an
+	 * information to the data sender that something is wrong, but they are
+	 * irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity.  We need this check
+	 * here too in case user space decides to not honor the error message
+	 * in sendmsg and still call recvmsg. This check here protects the
+	 * kernel integrity.
 	 */
 	if (!aead_sufficient_data(sk))
 		return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
index a251cd6bd5b9..b1f321b9f846 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@
  * The following concept of the memory management is used:
  *
  * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is
- * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling
- * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be
- * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must
- * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL.
+ * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendmsg. Filling up the TX
+ * SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be tracked by
+ * the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must provide a
+ * buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL.
  *
  * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is
  * allocated and prepared. As part of the recvmsg operation, the processed