Re: [PATCH v2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations

[Breno Leitao]

On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 10:31:35AM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 08:54:17AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 20, 2023 at 05:13:27PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 09:48:50AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> > > > There is no way to disable MDS, TAA, MMIO Stale data mitigation today at
> > > > compilation time. These mitigations are enabled even if
> > > > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is unset.
> > > > 
> > > > Create a new KCONFIG option for each mitigation under
> > > > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS that allows these
> > > > mitigations to be disabled by default at compilation time.
> > > 
> > > I don't think all mitigations are still controllable at build-time e.g.
> > > spectre_v2 eIBRS mitigation will still be deployed irrespective of the
> > > config.
> > 
> > Right. This patchset only cares about MDS, TAA and MMIO. I am more than
> > happy to send a new patch to also disable spectre_v2 eIBRS.
> 
> What about Retbleed, L1TF, SRBDS etc? I thought the goal is to control
> all speculation mitigations?
> 
> To be consistent CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS should control all
> speculation mitigations.

If I understand where you want to go, you think we should create a
single patchset that creates a CONFIG_<MITIGATION> for each mitigation,
and move get it under CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS.

Is this what you think we should do?

Thanks!