Re: [PATCH v12 21/22] x86/mce: Improve error log of kernel space TDX #MC due to erratum

[kirill . shutemov]

On Tue, Jun 27, 2023 at 02:12:51AM +1200, Kai Huang wrote:
> The first few generations of TDX hardware have an erratum.  Triggering
> it in Linux requires some kind of kernel bug involving relatively exotic
> memory writes to TDX private memory and will manifest via
> spurious-looking machine checks when reading the affected memory.
> 
> == Background ==
> 
> Virtually all kernel memory accesses operations happen in full
> cachelines.  In practice, writing a "byte" of memory usually reads a 64
> byte cacheline of memory, modifies it, then writes the whole line back.
> Those operations do not trigger this problem.
> 
> This problem is triggered by "partial" writes where a write transaction
> of less than cacheline lands at the memory controller.  The CPU does
> these via non-temporal write instructions (like MOVNTI), or through
> UC/WC memory mappings.  The issue can also be triggered away from the
> CPU by devices doing partial writes via DMA.
> 
> == Problem ==
> 
> A partial write to a TDX private memory cacheline will silently "poison"
> the line.  Subsequent reads will consume the poison and generate a
> machine check.  According to the TDX hardware spec, neither of these
> things should have happened.
> 
> To add insult to injury, the Linux machine code will present these as a
> literal "Hardware error" when they were, in fact, a software-triggered
> issue.
> 
> == Solution ==
> 
> In the end, this issue is hard to trigger.  Rather than do something
> rash (and incomplete) like unmap TDX private memory from the direct map,
> improve the machine check handler.
> 
> Currently, the #MC handler doesn't distinguish whether the memory is
> TDX private memory or not but just dump, for instance, below message:
> 
>  [...] mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 147: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 1: bd80000000100134
>  [...] mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffffadb69870> {__tlb_remove_page_size+0x10/0xa0}
>  	...
>  [...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii'
>  [...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel
>  [...] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal local machine check
> 
> Which says "Hardware Error" and "Data load in unrecoverable area of
> kernel".
> 
> Ideally, it's better for the log to say "software bug around TDX private
> memory" instead of "Hardware Error".  But in reality the real hardware
> memory error can happen, and sadly such software-triggered #MC cannot be
> distinguished from the real hardware error.  Also, the error message is
> used by userspace tool 'mcelog' to parse, so changing the output may
> break userspace.
> 
> So keep the "Hardware Error".  The "Data load in unrecoverable area of
> kernel" is also helpful, so keep it too.
> 
> Instead of modifying above error log, improve the error log by printing
> additional TDX related message to make the log like:
> 
>   ...
>  [...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel
>  [...] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine Check: TDX private memory error. Possible kernel bug.
> 
> Adding this additional message requires determination of whether the
> memory page is TDX private memory.  There is no existing infrastructure
> to do that.  Add an interface to query the TDX module to fill this gap.
> 
> == Impact ==
> 
> This issue requires some kind of kernel bug to trigger.
> 
> TDX private memory should never be mapped UC/WC.  A partial write
> originating from these mappings would require *two* bugs, first mapping
> the wrong page, then writing the wrong memory.  It would also be
> detectable using traditional memory corruption techniques like
> DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.
> 
> MOVNTI (and friends) could cause this issue with something like a simple
> buffer overrun or use-after-free on the direct map.  It should also be
> detectable with normal debug techniques.
> 
> The one place where this might get nasty would be if the CPU read data
> then wrote back the same data.  That would trigger this problem but
> would not, for instance, set off mechanisms like slab redzoning because
> it doesn't actually corrupt data.
> 
> With an IOMMU at least, the DMA exposure is similar to the UC/WC issue.
> TDX private memory would first need to be incorrectly mapped into the
> I/O space and then a later DMA to that mapping would actually cause the
> poisoning event.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov