Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs

[John Allen]

On Tue, Aug 01, 2023 at 09:42:09AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 01, 2023, John Allen wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 23, 2023 at 05:05:18PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Wed, May 24, 2023, John Allen wrote:
> > > > If kvm supports shadow stack, pass through shadow stack MSRs to improve
> > > > guest performance.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@xxxxxxx>
> > > > ---
> > > >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> > > >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  2 +-
> > > >  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > > > index 6df486bb1ac4..cdbce20989b8 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > > > @@ -136,6 +136,13 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
> > > >  	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT),		.always = false },
> > > >  	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT),		.always = false },
> > > >  	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR),		.always = false },
> > > > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_U_CET,                      .always = false },
> > > > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_S_CET,                      .always = false },
> > > > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,                .always = false },
> > > > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP,                    .always = false },
> > > > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP,                    .always = false },
> > > > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP,                    .always = false },
> > > > +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP,                    .always = false },
> > > >  	{ .index = MSR_INVALID,				.always = false },
> > > >  };
> > > >  
> > > > @@ -1181,6 +1188,16 @@ static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > > >  		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 1, 1);
> > > >  		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 1, 1);
> > > >  	}
> > > > +
> > > > +	if (kvm_cet_user_supported() && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> > > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_U_CET, 1, 1);
> > > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_S_CET, 1, 1);
> > > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, 1, 1);
> > > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, 1, 1);
> > > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, 1, 1);
> > > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, 1, 1);
> > > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 1, 1);
> > > > +	}
> > > 
> > > This is wrong, KVM needs to set/clear interception based on SHSKT, i.e. it can't
> > > be a one-way street.  Userspace *probably* won't toggle SHSTK in guest CPUID, but
> > > weirder things have happened.
> > 
> > Can you clarify what you mean by that? Do you mean that we need to check
> > both guest_cpuid_has and kvm_cpu_cap_has like the guest_can_use function
> > that is used in Weijiang Yang's series? Or is there something else I'm
> > omitting here?
> 
> When init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid() is called, KVM must not assume that the MSRs are
> currently intercepted, i.e. KVM can't just handle the case where userspace enables
> SHSTK, KVM must also handle the case where userspace disables SHSTK.
> 
> Using guest_can_use() is also a good idea, but it would likely lead to extra work
> on CPUs that don't support CET/SHSTK.  This isn't a fastpath, but toggling
> interception for MSRs that don't exist would be odd.  It's probably better to
> effectively open code guest_can_use(), which the KVM check gating the MSR toggling.
> 
> E.g. something like
> 
> 	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> 		bool shstk_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> 
> 		set_msr_inteception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_BLAH,
> 				    shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled);
> 	}

Thanks for the clarification. I will use the above method in the next
version of the series.