[tip: x86/shstk] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory

[tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/shstk branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     6beb99580bc040aed1d5fe7ed9083a4be77f3c20
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/6beb99580bc040aed1d5fe7ed9083a4be77f3c20
Author:        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:10:48 -07:00
Committer:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CommitterDate: Wed, 02 Aug 2023 15:01:20 -07:00

mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory

The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a
new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has
some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to
function properly.

In userspace, shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific,
controlled ways. However, since userspace can, even in the limited
ways, modify shadow stack contents, the kernel treats it as writable
memory. As a result, without additional work there would remain many
ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write arbitrary data to
shadow stacks via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) based operations. To
help userspace protect their shadow stacks, make this a little less
exposed by blocking writable get_user_pages() operations for shadow
stack VMAs.

Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
does for read-only protections. This is required for debugging use
cases.

[ dhansen: fix rebase goof, readd writable_file_mapping_allowed() hunk ]

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@xxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@xxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-23-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 +++++
 mm/gup.c                       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 61b5244..e95cfd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1631,6 +1631,11 @@ static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write)
 {
 	unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
 
+	/*
+	 * Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs are shadow stack, which the kernel
+	 * shouldn't generally allow access to, but since they
+	 * are already Write=0, the below logic covers both cases.
+	 */
 	if (write)
 		need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW;
 
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index 76d222c..44c2658 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
 		    !writable_file_mapping_allowed(vma, gup_flags))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
-		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
+		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE) || (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
 			if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
 				return -EFAULT;
 			/* hugetlb does not support FOLL_FORCE|FOLL_WRITE. */