[PATCH v9 02/23] x86/head_64: Store boot_params pointer in callee save register

From: Ard Biesheuvel
Date: Mon Aug 07 2023 - 12:28:14 EST


Instead of pushing/popping %RSI to/from the stack every time a function
is called from startup_64(), store it in a callee preserved register
and grab it from there when its value is actually needed.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 32 ++++++++------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index c5b9289837dcbad2..ea6995920b7aa920 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* for us. These identity mapped page tables map all of the
* kernel pages and possibly all of memory.
*
- * %rsi holds a physical pointer to real_mode_data.
+ * %RSI holds the physical address of the boot_params structure
+ * provided by the bootloader. Preserve it in %R15 so C function calls
+ * will not clobber it.
*
* We come here either directly from a 64bit bootloader, or from
* arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* compiled to run at we first fixup the physical addresses in our page
* tables and then reload them.
*/
+ mov %rsi, %r15

/* Set up the stack for verify_cpu() */
leaq (__end_init_task - PTREGS_SIZE)(%rip), %rsp
@@ -75,9 +78,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
shrq $32, %rdx
wrmsr

- pushq %rsi
call startup_64_setup_env
- popq %rsi

/* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
pushq $__KERNEL_CS
@@ -93,12 +94,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* Activate SEV/SME memory encryption if supported/enabled. This needs to
* be done now, since this also includes setup of the SEV-SNP CPUID table,
* which needs to be done before any CPUID instructions are executed in
- * subsequent code.
+ * subsequent code. Pass the boot_params pointer as the first argument.
*/
- movq %rsi, %rdi
- pushq %rsi
+ movq %r15, %rdi
call sme_enable
- popq %rsi
#endif

/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
@@ -111,9 +110,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
* programmed into CR3.
*/
leaq _text(%rip), %rdi
- pushq %rsi
+ movq %r15, %rsi
call __startup_64
- popq %rsi

/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
@@ -127,8 +125,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
* and someone has loaded a mapped page table.
*
- * %rsi holds a physical pointer to real_mode_data.
- *
* We come here either from startup_64 (using physical addresses)
* or from trampoline.S (using virtual addresses).
*
@@ -153,6 +149,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR

+ /* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */
+ xorq %r15, %r15
+
/*
* Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
* added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
@@ -199,13 +198,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
* hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
* attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
* the next RET instruction.
- * %rsi carries pointer to realmode data and is callee-clobbered. Save
- * and restore it.
*/
- pushq %rsi
movq %rax, %rdi
call sev_verify_cbit
- popq %rsi

/*
* Switch to new page-table
@@ -365,9 +360,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
wrmsr

/* Setup and Load IDT */
- pushq %rsi
call early_setup_idt
- popq %rsi

/* Check if nx is implemented */
movl $0x80000001, %eax
@@ -403,9 +396,8 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
pushq $0
popfq

- /* rsi is pointer to real mode structure with interesting info.
- pass it to C */
- movq %rsi, %rdi
+ /* Pass the boot_params pointer as first argument */
+ movq %r15, %rdi

.Ljump_to_C_code:
/*
--
2.39.2