Re: [PATCH 0/4] keys: Introduce a keys frontend for attestation reports

[Dionna Amalie Glaze]

> Isn't this more runtime attestation?  In which case you wouldn't use
> the boot report.  I assume someone somewhere is hacking the TPM-TLS
> protocol to also do RTMRs, but it strikes me we could just use a vTPM
> and the existing protocols.
>
> Even if you don't do anything as complex as TPM-TLS (and continuing
> runtime attestation), you can still make TLS conditioned on a private
> key released after a successful boot time attestation.  Since the boot
> evidence never changes, there's not much point doing it on each
> connection, so relying on a private key conditioned on boot evidence is
> just as good.
>
> James
>

The TPM quote will need to be bound to the VM instance, so there will
still be a hardware attestation in there that incorporates the user's
challenge.
Anything less than that is subject to replay attacks, no? Am I missing
a clever trick?

-- 
-Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)