Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/pti: Fix kernel warnings for pti= and nopti cmdline options.
From: Sohil Mehta
Date: Fri Aug 11 2023 - 15:13:39 EST
On 8/11/2023 11:23 AM, Jo Van Bulck wrote:
> On 08.08.23 17:13, Sohil Mehta wrote:> Can mitigations be off through
> some other mechanisms such as kernel config?
> I validated this both with and without the proposed patch.
>
Great, thanks for checking that. The existing print is accurate then. If
it is printed "disabled on command line.", then PTI has been disabled
due to a command line option.
>> Maybe split the mitigations_off check into a separate if and it's own
>> unique print message?
>> Also, with the separated check you can avoid the unnecessary re-setting
>> of pti_mode when pti_mode == PTI_FORCE_OFF is true.
>
> Thanks, makes sense. I'll make sure to do this in the next patch revision.
>
Based on above, even when you split the if check only a single print
would be enough, right?
>> In the rare case that both pti= and nopti is set the existing code seems
>> to ignore the nopti option. Would the new implementation do the same?
>
> Good point. In my understanding, passing such conflicting options is
> undefined as per the specification [2] and I'm not sure if backwards
> compatibility is a requirement?
>
> That being said, I can see the argument that in this case of
> security-sensitive functionality, it may be desirable to maintain
> identical behavior for identical kernel parameter combinations and
> sequences.
I don't believe that is a requirement either. Sometimes kernel command
lines can get very long and people make mistakes. I just thought it is
neat that the current code is defaulting that way and we should probably
keep the same behavior since it makes sense.
>
> --> I can update the patch to ensure backwards-compatible behavior in
> both cases for the next patch revision.
>
I agree, in both cases pti= overriding the other option (nopti or
mitigations=off) sounds reasonable to me.
Sohil