Re: [PATCH] cxl/mbox: Fix CEL logic for poison and security commands

From: Davidlohr Bueso
Date: Wed Sep 13 2023 - 15:45:32 EST


On Tue, 12 Sep 2023, Dan Williams wrote:

Ira Weiny wrote:
The following debug output was observed while testing CXL

cxl_core:cxl_walk_cel:721: cxl_mock_mem cxl_mem.0: Opcode 0x4300 unsupported by driver

opcode 0x4300 (Get Poison) is supported by the driver and the mock
device supports it. The logic should be checking that the opcode is
both not poison and not security.

Fix the logic to allow poison and security commands.

Fixes: ad64f5952ce3 ("cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported")
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@xxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
index ca60bb8114f2..b315bdab9197 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
@@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);

- if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) ||
- !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) {
+ if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) &&
+ !cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) {

Given that this is going to be a recurring pattern to add optional
command support, I am not a fan of continuing to expand this boolean
algebra eye exam.

How about the following to only do the validation check and enabling in
one place:

Agreed.

Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

... this also is a reminder of the need for regression testing/CI.

Thanks,
Davidlohr