Re: [PATCH] netfilter: ipset: add ip_set lock to ip_set_test
From: xiaolinkui
Date: Mon Oct 02 2023 - 23:05:35 EST
Hi,
On 10/3/23 03:06, Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote:
Hi,
On Mon, 2 Oct 2023, Simon Horman wrote:
On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 09:03:09PM +0800, xiaolinkui wrote:
From: Linkui Xiao <xiaolinkui@xxxxxxxxxx>
If the ip_set is not locked during ip_set_test, the following situations
may occur:
CPU0 CPU1
ip_rcv->
ip_rcv_finish->
ip_local_deliver->
nf_hook_slow->
iptable_filter_hook->
ipt_do_table->
set_match_v4->
ip_set_test-> list_set_destroy->
hash_net4_kadt-> set->data = NULL
I'm having a bit of trouble analysing this.
In particular, I'm concerned that in such a scenario set
itself will be also freed, which seems likely to lead to problems.
Can you provide a more complete call stack for CPU1 ?
ip_set_test() runs intentionally without holding a spinlock, it uses RCU.
But I don't understand the scenario at all:
CPU0: CPU1:
hash_net4_kadt list_set_destroy
so it's a hash:net type which works on a list
of set type of sets only
The list type of set can freely be destroyed (when not referenced), the
destroy operation has no effect whatsoever on its possible hash:net type
of member set.
Moreover, kernel side add/del/test can only be performed when the set in
question is referenced. Referenced sets cannot be deleted.
So what is the scenario really in this case?
The case I want to express should be like this:
CPU0 CPU1
ip_set_test
| (1) iptables -D -> set->ref --
| (2) ipset destroy -> set->data=NULL
|
hash_net4_kadt
|
hash_net4_test
For the convenience of description, the definition is as follows:
cmd(1): iptables -D
cmd(2): ipset destroy
When the ip_set test has already started in CPU0, but before it ends.
For example, when CPU0 runs between ip_set_test and hash_net4_kadt,
CPU1 executes cmd (1) and cmd (2).
In addition, if CPU 0 runs between hash_net4_kadt and hash_net4_test,
CPU1 executes cmd (1) and cmd (2). The following call trace will be
triggered:
crash> bt
PID: 0 TASK: ffff8003a1cd2680 CPU: 7 COMMAND: "swapper/7"
#0 [ffff8003fff3f460] crash_kexec at ffff0000081af828
#1 [ffff8003fff3f490] die at ffff00000808f754
#2 [ffff8003fff3f4d0] die_kernel_fault at ffff0000080aa9ac
#3 [ffff8003fff3f500] __do_kernel_fault at ffff0000080aa67c
#4 [ffff8003fff3f530] do_page_fault at ffff000008bfa66c
#5 [ffff8003fff3f620] do_translation_fault at ffff000008bfab64
#6 [ffff8003fff3f650] do_mem_abort at ffff000008081284
#7 [ffff8003fff3f830] el1_ia at ffff00000808310c
PC: ffff00000342225c [hash_net4_test+68]
LR: ffff000003420200 [hash_net4_kadt+208]
SP: ffff8003fff3f840 PSTATE: 60400005
X29: ffff8003fff3f840 X28: ffff8003a78ca600 X27: ffff8003fff3f908
X26: 0000000000000000 X25: ffff000000c70600 X24: ffff8003b8232400
X23: ffff000002f90fcc X22: 0000000000000000 X21: ffff8003fff3f9d0
X20: ffff8003fff3f910 X19: ffff8003fff3f9c8 X18: 0000000000000000
X17: 0000000000000000 X16: 0000000000000000 X15: 0000000000000000
X14: 970000002d494600 X13: 0000000000000000 X12: a40d15d8df825036
X11: ffff000000c70600 X10: ffff8003b2deb000 X9: 0000000000000001
X8: 0000000000000000 X7: 00000000637c7464 X6: ffff000003422218
X5: 00000000637c7464 X4: 0000000000000000 X3: ffff8003fff3f9d0
X2: ffff8003fff3f910 X1: ffff8003fff3f908 X0: 0000000000000020
#8 [ffff8003fff3f840] hash_net4_test at ffff000003422258
[ip_set_hash_net]
#9 [ffff8003fff3f8d0] hash_net4_kadt at ffff0000034201fc
[ip_set_hash_net]
#10 [ffff8003fff3f940] ip_set_test at ffff000002c011b8 [ip_set]
#11 [ffff8003fff3f990] set_match_v4 at ffff000002f90fc8 [xt_set]
#12 [ffff8003fff3fa20] ipt_do_table at ffff000000c504e0 [ip_tables]
#13 [ffff8003fff3fb60] iptable_filter_hook at ffff0000026e006c
[iptable_filter]
#14 [ffff8003fff3fb80] nf_hook_slow at ffff000008ac7a84
#15 [ffff8003fff3fbc0] ip_local_deliver at ffff000008ad5d88
#16 [ffff8003fff3fc10] ip_rcv_finish at ffff000008ad59b4
#17 [ffff8003fff3fc40] ip_rcv at ffff000008ad5dec
#18 [ffff8003fff3fca0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffff000008a6c344
#19 [ffff8003fff3fce0] __netif_receive_skb at ffff000008a6c3ac
#20 [ffff8003fff3fd00] netif_receive_skb_internal at ffff000008a6c440
#21 [ffff8003fff3fd30] napi_gro_receive at ffff000008a6d3ec
#22 [ffff8003fff3fd60] receive_buf at ffff000001c734d8 [virtio_net]
#23 [ffff8003fff3fe20] virtnet_poll at ffff000001c753e8 [virtio_net]
#24 [ffff8003fff3fec0] net_rx_action at ffff000008a6c9ec
#25 [ffff8003fff3ff60] __softirqentry_text_start at ffff0000080819f0
#26 [ffff8003fff3fff0] irq_exit at ffff0000080f1228
#27 [ffff8003fff40010] __handle_domain_irq at ffff000008162a10
Of course, the ip_set_test execution cycle is very short. During this
period,
another CPU needs to complete the cmd1 and cmd2 operations on the
ip_set, the
probability of triggering this problem will be very low.
This problem has also occurred in Red Hat:
https://access.redhat.com/solutions/6839381
But I think the solution mentioned in the link is not applicable.
Commit c120959387ef(netfilter: fix a use-after-free in mtype_destroy())
applies
to ip_set_bitmap instead of ip_set_hash.
Best regards,
Linkui
Best regards,
Jozsef
h = set->data
.cidr = INIT_CIDR(h->nets[0].cidr[0], HOST_MASK)
The set->data is empty, continuing to access set->data will result in a
kernel NULL pointer. The call trace is as follows:
[2350616.024418] Call trace:
[2350616.024670] hash_net4_kadt+0x38/0x148 [ip_set_hash_net]
[2350616.025147] ip_set_test+0xbc/0x230 [ip_set]
[2350616.025549] set_match_v4+0xac/0xd0 [xt_set]
[2350616.025951] ipt_do_table+0x32c/0x678 [ip_tables]
[2350616.026391] iptable_filter_hook+0x30/0x40 [iptable_filter]
[2350616.026905] nf_hook_slow+0x50/0x100
[2350616.027256] ip_local_deliver+0xd4/0xe8
[2350616.027616] ip_rcv_finish+0x90/0xb0
[2350616.027961] ip_rcv+0x50/0xb0
[2350616.028261] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x58/0x68
[2350616.028716] __netif_receive_skb+0x28/0x80
[2350616.029098] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3c/0xa8
[2350616.029533] napi_gro_receive+0xf8/0x170
[2350616.029898] receive_buf+0xec/0xa08 [virtio_net]
[2350616.030323] virtnet_poll+0x144/0x310 [virtio_net]
[2350616.030761] net_rx_action+0x158/0x3a0
[2350616.031124] __do_softirq+0x11c/0x33c
[2350616.031470] irq_exit+0x11c/0x128
[2350616.031793] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[2350616.032172] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x170
[2350616.032528] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[2350616.032835] arch_cpu_idle+0x38/0x1c0
[2350616.033183] default_idle_call+0x24/0x58
[2350616.033549] do_idle+0x1a4/0x268
[2350616.033859] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x78
[2350616.034234] secondary_start_kernel+0x17c/0x1c8
Signed-off-by: Linkui Xiao <xiaolinkui@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
index 35d2f9c9ada0..46f4f47e29e4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
@@ -747,7 +747,9 @@ ip_set_test(ip_set_id_t index, const struct sk_buff *skb,
!(opt->family == set->family || set->family == NFPROTO_UNSPEC))
return 0;
+ ip_set_lock(set);
ret = set->variant->kadt(set, skb, par, IPSET_TEST, opt);
+ ip_set_unlock(set);
if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
/* Type requests element to be completed */
--
2.17.1
-
E-mail : kadlec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kadlecsik.jozsef@xxxxxxxxx
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Address : Wigner Research Centre for Physics
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