On Sun, 1 Oct 2023 at 07:17, Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I think your patch is fine (well, whitespace-damaged, but conceptually good).OK, I looked into this a little bit, and it turns out that the problematicPeter Zijlstra (1):Hello, the commit above caused a crash on x86 kernel with
x86,static_call: Fix static-call vs return-thunk
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.
address here is from cleanup_trusted() in
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c.
(and it's builtin due to CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y)
The function is marked as __exit, so it does not fall within the
'core kernel text address range,' which is between _stext and _etext
(or between _sinittext and _einittext). and thus __text_poke() thinks that
it's vmalloc/module area.
I think __text_poke() should be taught that functions marked as __exit
also belong to kernel code just like __init.
But I also wonder about that
static_call_cond(trusted_key_exit)();
in cleanup_trusted(). It seems all kinds of pointless to use static
calls for something that is done *once*. That's not an optimization,
that's honestly just _stupid_. It costs more to do the rewriting that
it does to just do the one dynamic indirect call.
Side note: the same is true of the init-time call, which does
static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init);
...
ret = static_call(trusted_key_init)();
which again is a *lot* more expensive than just doing the indirect
function call.
So while I don't think your patch is wrong, I do think that the cause
here is plain silly code, and that trusted key code simply should not
do the crazy thing it does (and that causes silly problems).
Linus