Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] iommu: Validate that devices match domains

From: Robin Murphy
Date: Wed Oct 25 2023 - 12:05:18 EST


On 25/10/2023 1:55 pm, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
On Wed, Oct 25, 2023 at 01:39:56PM +0100, Robin Murphy wrote:
On 24/10/2023 7:52 pm, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
On Wed, Oct 11, 2023 at 07:14:50PM +0100, Robin Murphy wrote:

@@ -2279,10 +2280,16 @@ struct iommu_domain *iommu_get_dma_domain(struct device *dev)
static int __iommu_attach_group(struct iommu_domain *domain,
struct iommu_group *group)
{
+ struct device *dev;
+
if (group->domain && group->domain != group->default_domain &&
group->domain != group->blocking_domain)
return -EBUSY;
+ dev = iommu_group_first_dev(group);
+ if (!dev_has_iommu(dev) || dev_iommu_ops(dev) != domain->owner)
+ return -EINVAL;

I was thinking about this later, how does this work for the global
static domains? domain->owner will not be set?

if (alloc_type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY && ops->identity_domain)
return ops->identity_domain;
else if (alloc_type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED && ops->blocked_domain)
return ops->blocked_domain;

Seems like it will break everything?

I don't believe it makes any significant difference - as the commit message
points out, this validation is only applied at the public interface
boundaries of iommu_attach_group(), iommu_attach_device(),

Oh, making it only work for on domain type seems kind of hacky..

If that is the intention maybe the owner set should be moved into
iommu_domain_alloc() with a little comment noting that it is limited
to work in only a few cases?

I certainly didn't understand from the commit message to mean it was
only actually working for one domain type and this also blocks using
other types with the public interface.

It's not about one particular domain type, it's about the scope of what we consider valid usage. External API users should almost always be attaching to their own domain which they have allocated, however we also tolerate co-attaching additional groups to the same DMA domain in rare cases where it's reasonable. The fact is that those users cannot allocate blocking or identity domains, and I can't see that they would ever have any legitimate business trying to do anything with them anyway. So although yes, we technically lose some functionality once this intersects with the static domain optimisation, it's only questionable functionality which was never explicitly intended anyway.

I mean, what would be the valid purpose of trying to attach group A to group B's identity domain, even if they *were* backed by the same driver? At best it's pointless if group A also has its own identity domain already, otherwise at worst it's a deliberate attempt to circumvent a default domain policy imposed by the IOMMU core.

and iommu_attach_device_pasid(), which are only expected to be
operating on explicitly-allocated unmanaged domains.

We have nesting now in the iommufd branch, and SVA will come soon for
these APIs.

Regardless this will clash with the iommufd branch for this reason so
I guess it needs to wait till rc1.

Sigh, back on the shelf it goes then...

Thanks,
Robin.