Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] r8169: Coalesce RTL8411b PHY power-down recovery programming instructions to reduce spinlock stalls

From: Heiner Kallweit
Date: Mon Oct 30 2023 - 10:04:21 EST


On 30.10.2023 14:30, Mirsad Todorovac wrote:
>
>
> On 10/30/23 14:17, Heiner Kallweit wrote:
>> On 29.10.2023 05:56, Mirsad Todorovac wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/28/23 21:21, Heiner Kallweit wrote:
>>>> On 28.10.2023 13:05, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote:
>>>>> On RTL8411b the RX unit gets confused if the PHY is powered-down.
>>>>> This was reported in [0] and confirmed by Realtek. Realtek provided
>>>>> a sequence to fix the RX unit after PHY wakeup.
>>>>>
>>>>> A series of about 130 r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls is performed to
>>>>> program the RTL registers for recovery.
>>>>>
>>>>> r8168_mac_ocp_write() expands to this code:
>>>>>
>>>>>           static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
>>>>>           {
>>>>>                   if (rtl_ocp_reg_failure(reg))
>>>>>                           return;
>>>>>
>>>>>                   RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (reg << 15) | data);
>>>>>           }
>>>>>
>>>>>           static void r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
>>>>>           {
>>>>>                   unsigned long flags;
>>>>>
>>>>>                   raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>>>>                   __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, reg, data);
>>>>>                   raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>>>>           }
>>>>>
>>>>> Register programming is done through RTL_W32() macro which expands into
>>>>>
>>>>>           #define RTL_W32(tp, reg, val32) writel((val32), tp->mmio_addr + (reg))
>>>>>
>>>>> which is further (on Alpha):
>>>>>
>>>>>           extern inline void writel(u32 b, volatile void __iomem *addr)
>>>>>           {
>>>>>                   mb();
>>>>>                   __raw_writel(b, addr);
>>>>>           }
>>>>>
>>>>> or on i386/x86_64:
>>>>>
>>>>>       #define build_mmio_write(name, size, type, reg, barrier) \
>>>>>       static inline void name(type val, volatile void __iomem *addr) \
>>>>>       { asm volatile("mov" size " %0,%1": :reg (val), \
>>>>>       "m" (*(volatile type __force *)addr) barrier); }
>>>>>
>>>>>       build_mmio_write(writel, "l", unsigned int, "r", :"memory")
>>>>>
>>>>> This obviously involves iat least a compiler barrier.
>>>>>
>>>>> mb() expands into something like this i.e. on x86_64:
>>>>>
>>>>>           #define mb()    asm volatile("lock; addl $0,0(%%esp)" ::: "memory")
>>>>>
>>>>> This means a whole lot of memory bus barriers: for spin_lock_irqsave(),
>>>>> memory barrier, writel(), and spin_unlock_irqrestore().
>>>>>
>>>>> With about 130 of these sequential calls to r8168_mac_ocp_write() this looks like
>>>>> a LOCK storm that will thunder all of the cores and CPUs on the same memory controller
>>>>> for certain time that locked memory read-modify-write cyclo or I/O takes to finish.
>>>>>
>>>>> In a sequential case of RTL register programming, the writes to RTL registers
>>>>> can be coalesced under a same raw spinlock. This can dramatically decrease the
>>>>> number of bus stalls in a multicore or multi-CPU system:
>>>>>
>>>>>           static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>>>>                                                 const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
>>>>>           {
>>>>>                   struct recover_8411b_info const *p = array;
>>>>>
>>>>>                   while (p->reg) {
>>>>>                           if (!rtl_ocp_reg_failure(p->reg))
>>>>>                                   RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (p->reg << 15) | p->data);
>>>>>                           p++;
>>>>>                   }
>>>>>           }
>>>>>
>>>>>           static void r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>>>>                                               const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
>>>>>           {
>>>>>                   unsigned long flags;
>>>>>
>>>>>                   raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>>>>                   __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array);
>>>>>                   raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>>>>           }
>>>>>
>>>>>           static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
>>>>>           {
>>>>>
>>>>>                   ...
>>>>>
>>>>>                   /* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
>>>>>                    * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
>>>>>                    */
>>>>>
>>>>>                   static const struct recover_8411b_info init_zero_seq[] = {
>>>>>                           { 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
>>>>>              ...
>>>>>                   };
>>>>>
>>>>>                   static const struct recover_8411b_info recover_seq[] = {
>>>>>                           { 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
>>>>>              ...
>>>>>                   };
>>>>>
>>>>>                   static const struct recover_8411b_info final_seq[] = {
>>>>>                           { 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
>>>>>              ...
>>>>>                   };
>>>>>
>>>>>                   r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
>>>>>                   mdelay(3);
>>>>>                   r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
>>>>>                   r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
>>>>>                   r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
>>>>>                   r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
>>>>>           }
>>>>>
>>>>> The hex data is preserved intact through s/r8168_mac_ocp_write[(]tp,/{ / and s/[)];/ },/
>>>>> functions that only changed the function names and the ending of the line, so the actual
>>>>> hex data is unchanged.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note that the original reason for the introduction of the commit fe4e8db0392a6
>>>>> was to enable recovery of the RX unit on the RTL8411b which was confused by the
>>>>> powered-down PHY. This sequence of r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls amplifies the problem
>>>>
>>>> I still have a problem with this statement as you're saying that the original
>>>> problem still exists. I don't think that's the case.
>>>
>>> I will not disagree about it.
>>>
>>> But we have only reduced the number of spin_lock_irqsave/spin_unlock_irqrestore()
>>> pairs.
>>>
>>> Maybe additionally, on the low level, memory barrier isn't required for each write to
>>> MMIO?
>>>
>> One could argue whether in several places writel_relaxed() could be used.
>> But it's not really worth it, because we're not in a hot path.
>
> I see. Thank you for your evaluation.
>
> Using writel_relaxed() sounds clever. It expands to:
>
>     #define build_mmio_write(name, size, type, reg, barrier) \
>         static inline void name(type val, volatile void __iomem *addr) \
>          { asm volatile("mov" size " %0,%1": :reg (val), \
>                         "m" (*(volatile type __force *)addr) barrier); }
>     build_mmio_write(__writel, "l", unsigned int, "r", )
>     #define writel_relaxed(v, a) __writel(v, a)
>
> Here "barrier" is an empty string. Really clever. ;-)
>
> I will not contradict, but the cummulative amount of memory barriers on each MMIO read/write
> in each single one of the drivers could amount to some degrading of overall performance and
> latency in a multicore system.
>
> As I understood Mr. Jonathan Corbet on LWN, the initiative and trend is to reduce overall
> kernel latency.
>
Sure, but there's better places to look at first than a rarely used path in a driver.
See e.g. the history of threadad NAPI (and in general the RT Linux developments) or
the optimizations deep in the network stack Eric is working on.

> Thanks,
> Mirsad
>
>>> If it still uses a LOCK addl $0, m32/m64, then it still creates 130 instances of all core
>>> bus locks for this NIC reset after the lost PHY? I'm just thinking, this is nothing
>>> authoritative ...
>>>
>>>>> into a series of about 500+ memory bus locks, most waiting for the main memory read,
>>>>> modify and write under a LOCK. The memory barrier in RTL_W32 should suffice for
>>>>> the programming sequence to reach RTL NIC registers.
>>>>>
>>>>> [0] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1692075
>>>>>
>>>>> Fixes: fe4e8db0392a6 ("r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b")
>>>>> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> Cc: nic_swsd@xxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> Cc: netdev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>> Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231028005153.2180411-1-mirsad.todorovac@xxxxxxxxxxxx/
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> v3:
>>>>>    removed register/mask pair array sentinels, so using ARRAY_SIZE().
>>>>>    avoided duplication of RTL_W32() call code as advised by Heiner.
>>>>>
>>>>>    drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 198 ++++++++--------------
>>>>>    1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
>>>>> index 361b90007148..3b28bec7098b 100644
>>>>> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
>>>>> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
>>>>> @@ -939,6 +939,32 @@ static void r8168_mac_ocp_modify(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u16 mask,
>>>>>        raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>>>>    }
>>>>>    +struct e_info_regmask_pair {
>>>>> +    u32    reg;
>>>>> +    u32    data;
>>>>> +};
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>>>> +                      const struct e_info_regmask_pair *array, int len)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    struct e_info_regmask_pair const *p;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    for (p = array; len--; p++)
>>>>> +        __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, p->reg, p->data);
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void _r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>>>>> +                     const struct e_info_regmask_pair *array, int len)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    unsigned long flags;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>>>> +    __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array, len);
>>>>> +    raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#define r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, a) _r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, a, ARRAY_SIZE(a))
>>>>> +
>>>>>    /* Work around a hw issue with RTL8168g PHY, the quirk disables
>>>>>     * PHY MCU interrupts before PHY power-down.
>>>>>     */
>>>>> @@ -3107,138 +3133,58 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
>>>>>        /* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
>>>>>         * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
>>>>>         */
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC28, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x0000);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    static const struct e_info_regmask_pair init_zero_seq[] = {
>>>>> +        { 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
>>>>> +        { 0xFC30, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC32, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC34, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC36, 0x0000 },
>>>>> +    };
>>>>> +
>>>> Don't mix code and variable declarations. Did you run checkpatch?
>>>> I think it would complain here.
>>>
>>> Thank you for the warning, I will fix it.
>>>
>>> As I said to Mr. Greg, I will do the required number of iterations to fix this issue.
>>>
>>> I will add checkpatch to my routine handling of my submitted patches.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Mirsad
>>>
>>>>> +    static const struct e_info_regmask_pair recover_seq[] = {
>>>>> +        { 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
>>>>> +        { 0xF808, 0xE027 }, { 0xF80A, 0xE04F }, { 0xF80C, 0xE05E }, { 0xF80E, 0xE065 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF810, 0xC602 }, { 0xF812, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF814, 0x0000 }, { 0xF816, 0xC502 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF818, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF81A, 0x074C }, { 0xF81C, 0xC302 }, { 0xF81E, 0xBB00 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF820, 0x080A }, { 0xF822, 0x6420 }, { 0xF824, 0x48C2 }, { 0xF826, 0x8C20 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF828, 0xC516 }, { 0xF82A, 0x64A4 }, { 0xF82C, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF82E, 0xF009 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF830, 0x74A2 }, { 0xF832, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF834, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF836, 0xC50E },
>>>>> +        { 0xF838, 0x9CA2 }, { 0xF83A, 0x1C11 }, { 0xF83C, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF83E, 0xE006 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF840, 0x74F8 }, { 0xF842, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF844, 0x8CF8 }, { 0xF846, 0xC404 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF848, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84A, 0xC403 }, { 0xF84C, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84E, 0x0BF2 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF850, 0x0C0A }, { 0xF852, 0xE434 }, { 0xF854, 0xD3C0 }, { 0xF856, 0x49D9 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF858, 0xF01F }, { 0xF85A, 0xC526 }, { 0xF85C, 0x64A5 }, { 0xF85E, 0x1400 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF860, 0xF007 }, { 0xF862, 0x0C01 }, { 0xF864, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF866, 0x1C15 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF868, 0xC51B }, { 0xF86A, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF86C, 0xE013 }, { 0xF86E, 0xC519 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF870, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF872, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF874, 0x8CA0 }, { 0xF876, 0xC516 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF878, 0x74A4 }, { 0xF87A, 0x48C8 }, { 0xF87C, 0x48CA }, { 0xF87E, 0x9CA4 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF880, 0xC512 }, { 0xF882, 0x1B00 }, { 0xF884, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF886, 0x1B1C },
>>>>> +        { 0xF888, 0x483F }, { 0xF88A, 0x9BA2 }, { 0xF88C, 0x1B04 }, { 0xF88E, 0xC508 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF890, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF892, 0xC505 }, { 0xF894, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF896, 0xC502 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF898, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF89A, 0x0300 }, { 0xF89C, 0x051E }, { 0xF89E, 0xE434 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8A0, 0xE018 }, { 0xF8A2, 0xE092 }, { 0xF8A4, 0xDE20 }, { 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8A8, 0xC50F }, { 0xF8AA, 0x76A4 }, { 0xF8AC, 0x49E3 }, { 0xF8AE, 0xF007 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8B0, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF8B2, 0xF103 }, { 0xF8B4, 0xC607 }, { 0xF8B6, 0xBE00 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8B8, 0xC606 }, { 0xF8BA, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF8BC, 0xC602 }, { 0xF8BE, 0xBE00 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C }, { 0xF8C2, 0x0C28 }, { 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C }, { 0xF8C6, 0xDC00 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8C8, 0xC707 }, { 0xF8CA, 0x1D00 }, { 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2 }, { 0xF8CE, 0x48C1 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8D0, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8D2, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8D4, 0x00AA }, { 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0 },
>>>>> +        { 0xF8D8, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8DA, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8DC, 0x0132 },
>>>>> +    };
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    static const struct e_info_regmask_pair final_seq[] = {
>>>>> +        { 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
>>>>> +        { 0xFC32, 0x0C25 }, { 0xFC34, 0x00A9 }, { 0xFC36, 0x012D },
>>>>> +    };
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
>>>>>        mdelay(3);
>>>>>        r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
>>>>>    -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF800, 0xE008);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF802, 0xE00A);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF804, 0xE00C);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF806, 0xE00E);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF808, 0xE027);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80A, 0xE04F);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80C, 0xE05E);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80E, 0xE065);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF810, 0xC602);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF812, 0xBE00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF814, 0x0000);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF816, 0xC502);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF818, 0xBD00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81A, 0x074C);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81C, 0xC302);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81E, 0xBB00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF820, 0x080A);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF822, 0x6420);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF824, 0x48C2);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF826, 0x8C20);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF828, 0xC516);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82A, 0x64A4);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82C, 0x49C0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82E, 0xF009);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF830, 0x74A2);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF832, 0x8CA5);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF834, 0x74A0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF836, 0xC50E);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF838, 0x9CA2);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83A, 0x1C11);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83C, 0x9CA0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83E, 0xE006);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF840, 0x74F8);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF842, 0x48C4);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF844, 0x8CF8);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF846, 0xC404);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF848, 0xBC00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84A, 0xC403);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84C, 0xBC00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84E, 0x0BF2);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF850, 0x0C0A);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF852, 0xE434);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF854, 0xD3C0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF856, 0x49D9);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF858, 0xF01F);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85A, 0xC526);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85C, 0x64A5);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85E, 0x1400);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF860, 0xF007);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF862, 0x0C01);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF864, 0x8CA5);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF866, 0x1C15);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF868, 0xC51B);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86A, 0x9CA0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86C, 0xE013);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86E, 0xC519);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF870, 0x74A0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF872, 0x48C4);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF874, 0x8CA0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF876, 0xC516);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF878, 0x74A4);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87A, 0x48C8);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87C, 0x48CA);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87E, 0x9CA4);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF880, 0xC512);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF882, 0x1B00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF884, 0x9BA0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF886, 0x1B1C);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF888, 0x483F);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88A, 0x9BA2);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88C, 0x1B04);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88E, 0xC508);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF890, 0x9BA0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF892, 0xC505);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF894, 0xBD00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF896, 0xC502);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF898, 0xBD00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89A, 0x0300);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89C, 0x051E);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89E, 0xE434);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A0, 0xE018);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A2, 0xE092);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A4, 0xDE20);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A8, 0xC50F);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AA, 0x76A4);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AC, 0x49E3);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AE, 0xF007);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B0, 0x49C0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B2, 0xF103);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B4, 0xC607);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B6, 0xBE00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B8, 0xC606);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BA, 0xBE00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BC, 0xC602);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BE, 0xBE00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C2, 0x0C28);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C6, 0xDC00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C8, 0xC707);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CA, 0x1D00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CE, 0x48C1);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D0, 0xC502);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D2, 0xBD00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D4, 0x00AA);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D8, 0xC502);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DA, 0xBD00);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DC, 0x0132);
>>>>> +    r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
>>>>>          r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
>>>>>    -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0743);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0801);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x02FD);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0C25);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x00A9);
>>>>> -    r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x012D);
>>>>> +    r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
>>>>> +
>>>>>    }
>>>>>      static void rtl_hw_start_8168h_1(struct rtl8169_private *tp)