Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] x86/coco: Mark CoCo VM pages not present when changing encrypted state

From: kirill . shutemov
Date: Fri Nov 24 2023 - 05:06:40 EST


On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 01:20:08PM -0800, mhkelley58@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> From: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> In a CoCo VM when a page transitions from encrypted to decrypted, or vice
> versa, attributes in the PTE must be updated *and* the hypervisor must
> be notified of the change.

Strictly speaking it is not true for TDX. Conversion to shared can be
implicit: set shared bit and touch the page will do the conversion. MapGPA
is optional.

> Because there are two separate steps, there's
> a window where the settings are inconsistent. Normally the code that
> initiates the transition (via set_memory_decrypted() or
> set_memory_encrypted()) ensures that the memory is not being accessed
> during a transition, so the window of inconsistency is not a problem.
> However, the load_unaligned_zeropad() function can read arbitrary memory
> pages at arbitrary times, which could read a transitioning page during
> the window. In such a case, CoCo VM specific exceptions are taken
> (depending on the CoCo architecture in use). Current code in those
> exception handlers recovers and does "fixup" on the result returned by
> load_unaligned_zeropad(). Unfortunately, this exception handling can't
> work in paravisor scenarios (TDX Paritioning and SEV-SNP in vTOM mode)
> if the exceptions are routed to the paravisor. The paravisor can't
> do load_unaligned_zeropad() fixup, so the exceptions would need to
> be forwarded from the paravisor to the Linux guest, but there are
> no architectural specs for how to do that.

Hm. Can't we inject #PF (or #GP) into L2 if #VE/#VC handler in L1 sees
cross-page access to shared memory while no fixup entry for the page in
L1. It would give L2 chance to handle the situation in a transparent way.

Maybe I miss something, I donno.

--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov