[PATCH] exec: Check __FMODE_EXEC instead of in_execve for LSMs

[Kees Cook]

After commit 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before
doing anything else"), current->in_execve was no longer in sync with the
open(). This broke AppArmor and TOMOYO which depend on this flag to
distinguish "open" operations from being "exec" operations.

Instead of moving around in_execve, switch to using __FMODE_EXEC, which
is where the "is this an exec?" intent is stored. Note that TOMOYO still
uses in_execve around cred handling.

Reported-by: Kevin Locke <kevin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZbE4qn9_h14OqADK@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before doing anything else")
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx
Cc: apparmor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c  | 4 +++-
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 7717354ce095..98e1150bee9d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -469,8 +469,10 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
 	 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
 	 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
 	 * actually execute the image.
+	 *
+	 * Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode.
 	 */
-	if (current->in_execve) {
+	if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
 		fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 3c3af149bf1c..04a92c3d65d4 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -328,7 +328,8 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f)
 {
 	/* Don't check read permission here if called from execve(). */
-	if (current->in_execve)
+	/* Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode. */
+	if (f->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
 		return 0;
 	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path,
 					    f->f_flags);
-- 
2.34.1