On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 08:47:03AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 03:35:01PM +0800, Guixiong Wei wrote:
From: Guixiong Wei <weiguixiong@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Restrict non-privileged user access to /sys/kernel/notes to
avoid security attack.
The non-privileged users have read access to notes. The notes
expose the load address of startup_xen. This address could be
used to bypass KASLR.
How can it be used to bypass it?
KASLR is, for local users, pretty much not an issue, as that's not what
it protects from, only remote ones.
For example, the startup_xen is built at 0xffffffff82465180 and
commit_creds is built at 0xffffffff810ad570 which could read from
the /boot/System.map. And the loaded address of startup_xen is
0xffffffffbc265180 which read from /sys/kernel/notes. So the loaded
address of commit_creds is 0xffffffffbc265180 - (0xffffffff82465180
- 0xffffffff810ad570) = 0xffffffffbaead570.
I've cc: the hardening list on this, I'm sure the developers there have
opinions about this.
Oh eww, why is Xen spewing addresses into the notes section? (This must
be how it finds its entry point? But that would be before relocations
happen...)
But yes, I can confirm that relocations are done against the .notes
section at boot, so the addresses exposed in .notes is an immediate
KASLR offset exposure.