Re: [PATCH bpf v4] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access

[Puranjay Mohan]

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> On 3/21/24 1:46 PM, Puranjay Mohan wrote:
>> With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
>> thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
>> for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset overflows and
>> turns into a userspace address, the BPF program might read that memory if
>> the user has mapped it.
>> 
>> There are architectural features that prevent the kernel from accessing
>> userspace memory, like Privileged Access Never (PAN) on ARM64,
>> Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) on x86-64, Supervisor User
>> Memory access (SUM) on RISC-V, etc. But BPF should not rely on the
>> existence of these features.
>> 
>> Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
>> skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.
>> 
>> The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
>> the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
>> as default.
>> 
>> The implementation is as follows:
>> 
>> REG_AX =  SRC_REG
>> if(offset)
>> 	REG_AX += offset;
>> REG_AX >>= 32;
>> if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
>> 	DST_REG = 0;
>> else
>> 	DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);
>> 
>> Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
>> 32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
>> to a 4GB boundary before comparison.
>> 
>> The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
>> skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
>> than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
>> correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
>> above the userspace.
>> 
>> Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
>> dereferencing an untrusted pointer:
>> 
>>    SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
>>    int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
>>    {
>>                  *(volatile long *)sk;
>>                  return 0;
>>    }
>> 
>>      BPF Program before              |           BPF Program after
>>      ------------------              |           -----------------
>> 
>>    0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)          0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
>>    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>    1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\      1: (bf) r11 = r1
>>    ----------------------------\   \     2: (77) r11 >>= 32
>>    2: (b7) r0 = 0               \   \    3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2
>>    3: (95) exit                  \   \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
>>                                   \      5: (05) goto pc+1
>>                                    \     6: (b7) r1 = 0
>>                                     \--------------------------------------
>>                                          7: (b7) r0 = 0
>>                                          8: (95) exit
>> 
>> As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
>> are emitted.
>> 
>> Now, we analyse the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
>> X86-64, ARM64, and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load
>> instruction that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation
>> has been added around it.
>> 
>>                                  x86-64 JIT
>>                                  ==========
>>       JIT's Instrumentation                  Verifier's Instrumentation
>>            (upstream)                               (This patch)
>>       ---------------------                  --------------------------
>> 
>>     0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)             0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
>>     5:   xchg   %ax,%ax                      5:   xchg   %ax,%ax
>>     7:   push   %rbp                         7:   push   %rbp
>>     8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp                    8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
>>     b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi               b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
>>    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>     f:   movabs $0x800000000000,%r11         f:   mov    %rdi,%r10
>>    19:   cmp    %r11,%rdi                   12:   shr    $0x20,%r10
>>    1c:   jb     0x000000000000002a          16:   cmp    $0x8000,%r10
>>    1e:   mov    %rdi,%r11                   1d:   jbe    0x0000000000000025
>>    21:   add    $0x0,%r11              /--> 1f:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
>>    28:   jae    0x000000000000002e    /     23:   jmp    0x0000000000000027
>>    2a:   xor    %edi,%edi            /      25:   xor    %edi,%edi
>>    2c:   jmp    0x0000000000000032  / /------------------------------------
>>    2e:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi  ---/ /      27:   xor    %eax,%eax
>>    ---------------------------------/       29:   leave
>>    32:   xor    %eax,%eax                   2a:   ret
>>    34:   leave
>>    35:   ret
>> 
>> The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
>> memory access. The implementation in this patch leads to a smaller
>> number of instructions being emitted. In the worst case the JIT will
>> emit 9 extra instructions and this patch decreases it to 7.
>> 
>>                                    ARM64 JIT
>>                                    =========
>> 
>>          No Intrumentation                       Verifier's Instrumentation
>>             (upstream)                                  (This patch)
>>          -----------------                       --------------------------
>> 
>>     0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0                0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0
>>     4:   nop                                  4:   nop
>>     8:   paciasp                              8:   paciasp
>>     c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!        c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
>>    10:   mov     x29, sp                     10:   mov     x29, sp
>>    14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!       14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
>>    18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!       18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
>>    1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!       1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
>>    20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!       20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
>>    24:   mov     x25, sp                     24:   mov     x25, sp
>>    28:   mov     x26, #0x0                   28:   mov     x26, #0x0
>>    2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0              2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0
>>    30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0                30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0
>>    34:   ldr     x0, [x0]                    34:   ldr     x0, [x0]
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>    38:   ldr     x0, [x0] ----------\        38:   add     x9, x0, #0x0
>> -----------------------------------\\       3c:   lsr     x9, x9, #32
>>    3c:   mov     x7, #0x0            \\      40:   cmp     x9, #0x10, lsl #12
>>    40:   mov     sp, sp               \\     44:   b.ls    0x0000000000000050
>>    44:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16   \\--> 48:   ldr     x0, [x0]
>>    48:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16    \    4c:   b       0x0000000000000054
>>    4c:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16     \   50:   mov     x0, #0x0
>>    50:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16      \---------------------------------------
>>    54:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16         54:   mov     x7, #0x0
>>    58:   add     x0, x7, #0x0                58:   mov     sp, sp
>>    5c:   autiasp                             5c:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16
>>    60:   ret                                 60:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16
>>    64:   nop                                 64:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16
>>    68:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000070     68:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16
>>    6c:   br      x10                         6c:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16
>>                                              70:   add     x0, x7, #0x0
>>                                              74:   autiasp
>>                                              78:   ret
>>                                              7c:   nop
>>                                              80:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000088
>>                                              84:   br      x10
>> 
>> There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
>> become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).
>> 
>>                             RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
>>                             ==========
>> 
>>          No Intrumentation           Verifier's Instrumentation
>>             (upstream)                      (This patch)
>>          -----------------           --------------------------
>> 
>>     0:   nop                            0:   nop
>>     4:   nop                            4:   nop
>>     8:   li      a6, 33                 8:   li      a6, 33
>>     c:   addi    sp, sp, -16            c:   addi    sp, sp, -16
>>    10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)             10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)
>>    14:   addi    s0, sp, 16            14:   addi    s0, sp, 16
>>    18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)             18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>>    1c:   ld      a0, 0(a0) --\         1c:   mv      t0, a0
>> --------------------------\  \        20:   srli    t0, t0, 32
>>    20:   li      a5, 0      \  \       24:   lui     t1, 4096
>>    24:   ld      s0, 8(sp)   \  \      28:   sext.w  t1, t1
>>    28:   addi    sp, sp, 16   \  \     2c:   bgeu    t1, t0, 12
>>    2c:   sext.w  a0, a5        \  \--> 30:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
>>    30:   ret                    \      34:   j       8
>>                                  \     38:   li      a0, 0
>>                                   \------------------------------
>>                                        3c:   li      a5, 0
>>                                        40:   ld      s0, 8(sp)
>>                                        44:   addi    sp, sp, 16
>>                                        48:   sext.w  a0, a5
>>                                        4c:   ret
>> 
>> There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.
>> 
>> Fixes: 800834285361 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
>> Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@xxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> V3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321120842.78983-1-puranjay12@xxxxxxxxx/
>> Changes in V4:
>> - Disable this feature on architectures that don't define
>>    CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
>> - By doing the above, we don't need anything explicitly for s390x.
>> 
>> V2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321101058.68530-1-puranjay12@xxxxxxxxx/
>> Changes in V3:
>> - Return 0 from bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() in disabled case because it
>>    returns u64.
>> - Modify the check in verifier to no do instrumentation when uaddress_limit
>>    is 0.
>> 
>> V1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240320105436.4781-1-puranjay12@xxxxxxxxx/
>> Changes in V2:
>> - Disable this feature on s390x.
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 72 +++++--------------------------------
>>   include/linux/filter.h      |  1 +
>>   kernel/bpf/core.c           |  9 +++++
>>   kernel/bpf/verifier.c       | 30 ++++++++++++++++
>>   4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
>> 
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> index 4900b1ee019f..9b3136187938 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> @@ -1327,7 +1327,6 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, u8 *rw_image
>>   		u8 b2 = 0, b3 = 0;
>>   		u8 *start_of_ldx;
>>   		s64 jmp_offset;
>> -		s16 insn_off;
>>   		u8 jmp_cond;
>>   		u8 *func;
>>   		int nops;
>> @@ -1802,78 +1801,18 @@ st:			if (is_imm8(insn->off))
>>   		case BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX | BPF_B:
>>   		case BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX | BPF_H:
>>   		case BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX | BPF_W:
>> -			insn_off = insn->off;
>> -
>> -			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
>> -			    BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX) {
>> -				/* Conservatively check that src_reg + insn->off is a kernel address:
>> -				 *   src_reg + insn->off >= TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE
>> -				 * src_reg is used as scratch for src_reg += insn->off and restored
>> -				 * after emit_ldx if necessary
>> -				 */
>> -
>> -				u64 limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE;
>> -				u8 *end_of_jmp;
>> -
>> -				/* At end of these emitted checks, insn->off will have been added
>> -				 * to src_reg, so no need to do relative load with insn->off offset
>> -				 */
>> -				insn_off = 0;
>> -
>> -				/* movabsq r11, limit */
>> -				EMIT2(add_1mod(0x48, AUX_REG), add_1reg(0xB8, AUX_REG));
>> -				EMIT((u32)limit, 4);
>> -				EMIT(limit >> 32, 4);
>> -
>> -				if (insn->off) {
>> -					/* add src_reg, insn->off */
>> -					maybe_emit_1mod(&prog, src_reg, true);
>> -					EMIT2_off32(0x81, add_1reg(0xC0, src_reg), insn->off);
>> -				}
>> -
>> -				/* cmp src_reg, r11 */
>> -				maybe_emit_mod(&prog, src_reg, AUX_REG, true);
>> -				EMIT2(0x39, add_2reg(0xC0, src_reg, AUX_REG));
>> -
>> -				/* if unsigned '>=', goto load */
>> -				EMIT2(X86_JAE, 0);
>> -				end_of_jmp = prog;
>> -
>> -				/* xor dst_reg, dst_reg */
>> -				emit_mov_imm32(&prog, false, dst_reg, 0);
>> -				/* jmp byte_after_ldx */
>> -				EMIT2(0xEB, 0);
>> -
>> -				/* populate jmp_offset for JAE above to jump to start_of_ldx */
>> -				start_of_ldx = prog;
>> -				end_of_jmp[-1] = start_of_ldx - end_of_jmp;
>> -			}
>> +			start_of_ldx = prog;
>>   			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX ||
>>   			    BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX)
>> -				emit_ldsx(&prog, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn_off);
>> +				emit_ldsx(&prog, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn->off);
>>   			else
>> -				emit_ldx(&prog, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn_off);
>> +				emit_ldx(&prog, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn->off);
>>   			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
>>   			    BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX) {
>>   				struct exception_table_entry *ex;
>>   				u8 *_insn = image + proglen + (start_of_ldx - temp);
>>   				s64 delta;
>>   
>> -				/* populate jmp_offset for JMP above */
>> -				start_of_ldx[-1] = prog - start_of_ldx;
>> -
>> -				if (insn->off && src_reg != dst_reg) {
>> -					/* sub src_reg, insn->off
>> -					 * Restore src_reg after "add src_reg, insn->off" in prev
>> -					 * if statement. But if src_reg == dst_reg, emit_ldx
>> -					 * above already clobbered src_reg, so no need to restore.
>> -					 * If add src_reg, insn->off was unnecessary, no need to
>> -					 * restore either.
>> -					 */
>> -					maybe_emit_1mod(&prog, src_reg, true);
>> -					EMIT2_off32(0x81, add_1reg(0xE8, src_reg), insn->off);
>> -				}
>> -
>>   				if (!bpf_prog->aux->extable)
>>   					break;
>>   
>> @@ -3473,3 +3412,8 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg(void)
>>   {
>>   	return true;
>>   }
>> +
>> +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void)
>> +{
>> +	return TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE;
>> +}
>> diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
>> index c0d51bff8f96..cf12bfa2a78c 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/filter.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/filter.h
>> @@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call(void);
>>   bool bpf_jit_supports_exceptions(void);
>>   bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg(void);
>>   bool bpf_jit_supports_arena(void);
>> +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void);
>>   void arch_bpf_stack_walk(bool (*consume_fn)(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp), void *cookie);
>>   bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func);
>>   
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> index 5aacb1d3c4cc..a04695ca82b9 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> @@ -2958,6 +2958,15 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_arena(void)
>>   	return false;
>>   }
>>   
>> +u64 __weak bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void)
>> +{
>> +#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE)
>> +	return TASK_SIZE;
>> +#else
>> +	return 0;
>> +#endif
>> +}
>> +
>>   /* Return TRUE if the JIT backend satisfies the following two conditions:
>>    * 1) JIT backend supports atomic_xchg() on pointer-sized words.
>>    * 2) Under the specific arch, the implementation of xchg() is the same
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index de7813947981..7ce56da6cfa4 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -19657,6 +19657,36 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>>   			goto next_insn;
>>   		}
>>   
>> +		/* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */
>> +		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
>> +		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
>> +		     BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) {
>> +			struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
>> +			u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit();
>> +
>> +			if (!uaddress_limit)
>> +				goto next_insn;
>> +
>> +			*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg);
>> +			if (insn->off)
>> +				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off);
>> +			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
>> +			*patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2);
>> +			*patch++ = *insn;
>> +			*patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
>> +			*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0);
>
> But how does this address other cases where we could fault e.g. non-canonical,
> vsyscall page, etc? Technically, we would have to call to copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed()
> to really address all the cases aside from the overflow (good catch btw!) where kernel
> turns into user address.

So, we are trying to ~simulate a call to
copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() here. If the address under
consideration is below TASK_SIZE (TASK_SIZE + 4GB to be precise) then we
skip that load because that address could be mapped by the user.

If the address is above TASK_SIZE + 4GB, we allow the load and it could
cause a fault if the address is invalid, non-canonical etc. Taking the
fault is fine because JIT will add an exception table entry for
for that load with BPF_PBOBE_MEM.

The vsyscall page is special, this approach skips all loads from this
page. I am not sure if that is acceptable.


Thanks,
Puranjay