Re: [RESEND][PATCH v3] security: Place security_path_post_mknod() where the original IMA call was

[Al Viro]

On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 11:07:49AM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Commit 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
> introduced security_path_post_mknod(), to replace the IMA-specific call to
> ima_post_path_mknod().
> 
> For symmetry with security_path_mknod(), security_path_post_mknod() was
> called after a successful mknod operation, for any file type, rather than
> only for regular files at the time there was the IMA call.
> 
> However, as reported by VFS maintainers, successful mknod operation does
> not mean that the dentry always has an inode attached to it (for example,
> not for FIFOs on a SAMBA mount).
> 
> If that condition happens, the kernel crashes when
> security_path_post_mknod() attempts to verify if the inode associated to
> the dentry is private.
> 
> Move security_path_post_mknod() where the ima_post_path_mknod() call was,
> which is obviously correct from IMA/EVM perspective. IMA/EVM are the only
> in-kernel users, and only need to inspect regular files.
> 
> Reported-by: Steve French <smfrench@xxxxxxxxx>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CAH2r5msAVzxCUHHG8VKrMPUKQHmBpE6K9_vjhgDa1uAvwx4ppw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Fixes: 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>

LGTM...