[PATCH 1/3] cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions
From: Dongsheng Yang
Date: Mon Apr 22 2024 - 04:18:32 EST
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same
goes for both sanitize and secure erase.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-2-dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
index 6350dd82b9a9..c4c4acb1f3b3 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
@@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ Description:
whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires
- the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.
+ the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
+ HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
+ management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
+ transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
+ states.
What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
@@ -92,7 +96,12 @@ Contact: linux-cxl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Description:
(WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for
- all user data areas of the device.
+ all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires
+ the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
+ HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
+ management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
+ transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
+ states.
What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
--
2.34.1