Re: [RFC PATCH 23/41] KVM: x86/pmu: Implement the save/restore of PMU state for Intel CPU
From: maobibo
Date: Mon Apr 22 2024 - 23:55:50 EST
On 2024/4/23 上午11:13, Mi, Dapeng wrote:
On 4/23/2024 10:53 AM, maobibo wrote:
On 2024/4/23 上午10:44, Mi, Dapeng wrote:
On 4/23/2024 9:01 AM, maobibo wrote:
On 2024/4/23 上午1:01, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Mon, Apr 22, 2024, maobibo wrote:
On 2024/4/16 上午6:45, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Mon, Apr 15, 2024, Mingwei Zhang wrote:
On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 10:38 AM Sean Christopherson
<seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
One my biggest complaints with the current vPMU code is that
the roles and
responsibilities between KVM and perf are poorly defined, which
leads to suboptimal
and hard to maintain code.
Case in point, I'm pretty sure leaving guest values in PMCs
_would_ leak guest
state to userspace processes that have RDPMC permissions, as
the PMCs might not
be dirty from perf's perspective (see
perf_clear_dirty_counters()).
Blindly clearing PMCs in KVM "solves" that problem, but in
doing so makes the
overall code brittle because it's not clear whether KVM _needs_
to clear PMCs,
or if KVM is just being paranoid.
So once this rolls out, perf and vPMU are clients directly to
PMU HW.
I don't think this is a statement we want to make, as it opens a
discussion
that we won't win. Nor do I think it's one we *need* to make.
KVM doesn't need
to be on equal footing with perf in terms of owning/managing PMU
hardware, KVM
just needs a few APIs to allow faithfully and accurately
virtualizing a guest PMU.
Faithful cleaning (blind cleaning) has to be the baseline
implementation, until both clients agree to a "deal" between them.
Currently, there is no such deal, but I believe we could have
one via
future discussion.
What I am saying is that there needs to be a "deal" in place
before this code
is merged. It doesn't need to be anything fancy, e.g. perf can
still pave over
PMCs it doesn't immediately load, as opposed to using
cpu_hw_events.dirty to lazily
do the clearing. But perf and KVM need to work together from the
get go, ie. I
don't want KVM doing something without regard to what perf does,
and vice versa.
There is similar issue on LoongArch vPMU where vm can directly pmu
hardware
and pmu hw is shard with guest and host. Besides context switch
there are
other places where perf core will access pmu hw, such as tick
timer/hrtimer/ipi function call, and KVM can only intercept
context switch.
Two questions:
1) Can KVM prevent the guest from accessing the PMU?
2) If so, KVM can grant partial access to the PMU, or is it all
or nothing?
If the answer to both questions is "yes", then it sounds like
LoongArch *requires*
mediated/passthrough support in order to virtualize its PMU.
Hi Sean,
Thank for your quick response.
yes, kvm can prevent guest from accessing the PMU and grant partial
or all to access to the PMU. Only that if one pmu event is granted
to VM, host can not access this pmu event again. There must be pmu
event switch if host want to.
PMU event is a software entity which won't be shared. did you mean if
a PMU HW counter is granted to VM, then Host can't access the PMU HW
counter, right?
yes, if PMU HW counter/control is granted to VM. The value comes from
guest, and is not meaningful for host. Host pmu core does not know
that it is granted to VM, host still think that it owns pmu.
That's one issue this patchset tries to solve. Current new mediated x86
vPMU framework doesn't allow Host or Guest own the PMU HW resource
simultaneously. Only when there is no !exclude_guest event on host,
guest is allowed to exclusively own the PMU HW resource.
Just like FPU register, it is shared by VM and host during different
time and it is lately switched. But if IPI or timer interrupt uses FPU
register on host, there will be the same issue.
I didn't fully get your point. When IPI or timer interrupt reach, a
VM-exit is triggered to make CPU traps into host first and then the host
yes, it is.
interrupt handler is called. Or are you complaining the executing
sequence of switching guest PMU MSRs and these interrupt handler?
In our vPMU implementation, it is ok if vPMU is switched in vm exit
path, however there is problem if vPMU is switched during vcpu thread
sched-out/sched-in path since IPI/timer irq interrupt access pmu
register in host mode.
In general it will be better if the switch is done in vcpu thread
sched-out/sched-in, else there is requirement to profile kvm
hypervisor.Even there is such requirement, it is only one option. In
most conditions, it will better if time of VM context exit is small.
Regards
Bibo Mao
Can we add callback handler in structure kvm_guest_cbs? just like
this:
@@ -6403,6 +6403,7 @@ static struct perf_guest_info_callbacks
kvm_guest_cbs
= {
.state = kvm_guest_state,
.get_ip = kvm_guest_get_ip,
.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,
+ .lose_pmu = kvm_guest_lose_pmu,
};
By the way, I do not know should the callback handler be triggered
in perf
core or detailed pmu hw driver. From ARM pmu hw driver, it is
triggered in
pmu hw driver such as function kvm_vcpu_pmu_resync_el0,
but I think it will be better if it is done in perf core.
I don't think we want to take the approach of perf and KVM guests
"fighting" over
the PMU. That's effectively what we have today, and it's a mess
for KVM because
it's impossible to provide consistent, deterministic behavior for
the guest. And
it's just as messy for perf, which ends up having wierd, cumbersome
flows that
exists purely to try to play nice with KVM.
With existing pmu core code, in tick timer interrupt or IPI function
call interrupt pmu hw may be accessed by host when VM is running and
pmu is already granted to guest. KVM can not intercept host
IPI/timer interrupt, there is no pmu context switch, there will be
problem.
Regards
Bibo Mao