Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] TPM derived keys

[Ignat Korchagin]

On Tue, May 14, 2024 at 3:00 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Tue May 14, 2024 at 4:11 PM EEST, Ignat Korchagin wrote:
> > For example, a cheap NAS box with no internal storage (disks connected
> > externally via USB). We want:
> >   * disks to be encrypted and decryptable only by this NAS box
>
> So how this differs from LUKS2 style, which also systemd supports where
> the encryption key is anchored to PCR's? If I took hard drive out of my
> Linux box, I could not decrypt it in another machine because of this.

It differs with the fact that the disk has a clearly identifiable
LUKS2 header, which tells an adversary that this is a disk with some
data that is encrypted. With derived keys and plain dm-crypt mode
there is no LUKS header, so it is not possible to tell if it is an
encrypted disk or a disk with just random data. Additionally, if I
accidentally wipe the sector with the LUKS2 header - all my data is
lost (because the data encryption key from the header is lost). With
derived keys I can always decrypt at least some data, if the disk is
available.

> >   * if someone steals one of the disks - we don't want them to see it
> > has encrypted data (no LUKS header)
>
> So what happens when you reconnect?

We recover/derive the encryption key and unlock the disk again.

> > Additionally we may want to SSH into the NAS for configuration and we
> > don't want the SSH server key to change after each boot (regardless if
> > disks are connected or not).
>
> Right, interesting use case. Begin before any technical jargon exactly
> with a great example like this. Then it is easier to start to anchoring
> stuff and not be misleaded.
>
> BR, Jarkko