Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
From: Ard Biesheuvel
Date: Fri May 31 2024 - 07:00:38 EST
Hello Ross,
On Fri, 31 May 2024 at 03:32, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and
> later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol
> sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is
> conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch
> Environment) header in the structure named mle_header. The offset of the
> MLE header is set in the kernel_info. The routine sl_stub contains the
> very early late launch setup code responsible for setting up the basic
> environment to allow the normal kernel startup_32 code to proceed. It is
> also responsible for properly waking and handling the APs on Intel
> platforms. The routine sl_main which runs after entering 64b mode is
> responsible for measuring configuration and module information before
> it is used like the boot params, the kernel command line, the TXT heap,
> an external initramfs, etc.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst | 21 +
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +-
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 30 +
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 34 ++
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c | 577 ++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S | 725 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 20 +
> 9 files changed, 1415 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
> index 4fd492cb4970..295cdf9bcbdb 100644
> --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
> @@ -482,6 +482,14 @@ Protocol: 2.00+
> - If 1, KASLR enabled.
> - If 0, KASLR disabled.
>
> + Bit 2 (kernel internal): SLAUNCH_FLAG
> +
> + - Used internally by the setup kernel to communicate
> + Secure Launch status to kernel proper.
> +
> + - If 1, Secure Launch enabled.
> + - If 0, Secure Launch disabled.
> +
> Bit 5 (write): QUIET_FLAG
>
> - If 0, print early messages.
> @@ -1028,6 +1036,19 @@ Offset/size: 0x000c/4
>
> This field contains maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs.
>
> +============ =================
> +Field name: mle_header_offset
> +Offset/size: 0x0010/4
> +============ =================
> +
> + This field contains the offset to the Secure Launch Measured Launch Environment
> + (MLE) header. This offset is used to locate information needed during a secure
> + late launch using Intel TXT. If the offset is zero, the kernel does not have
> + Secure Launch capabilities. The MLE entry point is called from TXT on the BSP
> + following a success measured launch. The specific state of the processors is
> + outlined in the TXT Software Development Guide, the latest can be found here:
> + https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf
> +
>
Could we just repaint this field as the offset relative to the start
of kernel_info rather than relative to the start of the image? That
way, there is no need for patch #1, and given that the consumer of
this field accesses it via kernel_info, I wouldn't expect any issues
in applying this offset to obtain the actual address.
> The Image Checksum
> ==================
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
> index 9189a0e28686..9076a248d4b4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
> @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI) += $(obj)/efi.o
> vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_mixed.o
> vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
>
> -vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o
> +vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o \
> + $(obj)/sl_main.o $(obj)/sl_stub.o
>
> $(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) FORCE
> $(call if_changed,ld)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> index 1dcb794c5479..803c9e2e6d85 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> @@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64)
> pushq $0
> popfq
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> + /* Ensure the relocation region is coverd by a PMR */
covered
> + movq %rbx, %rdi
> + movl $(_bss - startup_32), %esi
> + callq sl_check_region
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer
> * where decompression in place becomes safe.
> @@ -462,6 +469,29 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
> shrq $3, %rcx
> rep stosq
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> + /*
> + * Have to do the final early sl stub work in 64b area.
> + *
> + * *********** NOTE ***********
> + *
> + * Several boot params get used before we get a chance to measure
> + * them in this call. This is a known issue and we currently don't
> + * have a solution. The scratch field doesn't matter. There is no
> + * obvious way to do anything about the use of kernel_alignment or
> + * init_size though these seem low risk with all the PMR and overlap
> + * checks in place.
> + */
> + movq %r15, %rdi
> + callq sl_main
> +
> + /* Ensure the decompression location is covered by a PMR */
> + movq %rbp, %rdi
> + movq output_len(%rip), %rsi
> + callq sl_check_region
> +#endif
> +
> + pushq %rsi
This looks like a rebase error.
> call load_stage2_idt
>
> /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
> index c18f07181dd5..e199b87764e9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
> @@ -28,6 +28,40 @@ SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info)
> /* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */
> .long SETUP_TYPE_MAX
>
> + /* Offset to the MLE header structure */
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
> + .long rva(mle_header)
.. so this could just be mle_header - kernel_info, and the consumer
can do the math instead.
> +#else
> + .long 0
> +#endif
> +
> kernel_info_var_len_data:
> /* Empty for time being... */
> SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end)
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
> + /*
> + * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1
> + * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set:
> + * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup
> + * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address
> + * bit 2: The ECX register will contain the pointer to the MLE page table
> + * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support
> + * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant
> + */
> +SYM_DATA_START(mle_header)
> + .long 0x9082ac5a /* UUID0 */
> + .long 0x74a7476f /* UUID1 */
> + .long 0xa2555c0f /* UUID2 */
> + .long 0x42b651cb /* UUID3 */
> + .long 0x00000034 /* MLE header size */
> + .long 0x00020002 /* MLE version 2.2 */
> + .long rva(sl_stub_entry) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */
and these should perhaps be relative to mle_header?
> + .long 0x00000000 /* First valid page of MLE */
> + .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */
> + .long rva(_edata) /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */
and here
> + .long 0x00000227 /* Bit vector of MLE-supported capabilities */
> + .long 0x00000000 /* Starting linear address of command line (unused) */
> + .long 0x00000000 /* Ending linear address of command line (unused) */
> +SYM_DATA_END(mle_header)
> +#endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..61e9baf410fd
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,577 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Secure Launch early measurement and validation routines.
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2024, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +#include <linux/string.h>
> +#include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <asm/segment.h>
> +#include <asm/boot.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/mtrr.h>
> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
> +#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha1.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha2.h>
> +
> +#define CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK 0xff
> +
> +#define SL_TPM12_LOG 1
> +#define SL_TPM20_LOG 2
> +
> +#define SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS 2
> +
> +#define SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA 64
> +#define SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + \
> + SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA)
> +#define SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head) + \
> + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + \
> + sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + \
> + SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA)
> +
> +static void *evtlog_base;
> +static u32 evtlog_size;
> +static struct txt_heap_event_log_pointer2_1_element *log20_elem;
> +static u32 tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM12_LOG;
> +static struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs tpm_algs[SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS] = {0};
> +
> +extern u32 sl_cpu_type;
> +extern u32 sl_mle_start;
> +
> +static u64 sl_txt_read(u32 reg)
> +{
> + return readq((void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg));
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_txt_write(u32 reg, u64 val)
> +{
> + writeq(val, (void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg));
> +}
> +
> +static void __noreturn sl_txt_reset(u64 error)
> +{
> + /* Reading the E2STS register acts as a barrier for TXT registers */
> + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_ERRORCODE, error);
> + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS);
> + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, 1);
> + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS);
> + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_RESET, 1);
> +
> + for ( ; ; )
> + asm volatile ("hlt");
> +
> + unreachable();
> +}
> +
> +static u64 sl_rdmsr(u32 reg)
> +{
> + u64 lo, hi;
> +
> + asm volatile ("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) : "c" (reg));
> +
> + return (hi << 32) | lo;
> +}
> +
> +static struct slr_table *sl_locate_and_validate_slrt(void)
> +{
> + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
> + struct slr_table *slrt;
> + void *txt_heap;
> +
> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
> + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
> +
> + if (!os_mle_data->slrt)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT);
> +
> + slrt = (struct slr_table *)os_mle_data->slrt;
> +
> + if (slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT);
> +
> + if (slrt->architecture != SLR_INTEL_TXT)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT);
> +
> + return slrt;
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_check_pmr_coverage(void *base, u32 size, bool allow_hi)
> +{
> + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
> + void *end = base + size;
> + void *txt_heap;
> +
> + if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL))
> + return;
> +
> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
> + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
> +
> + if ((end >= (void *)0x100000000ULL) && (base < (void *)0x100000000ULL))
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_STRADDLE_4GB);
> +
> + /*
> + * Note that the late stub code validates that the hi PMR covers
> + * all memory above 4G. At this point the code can only check that
> + * regions are within the hi PMR but that is sufficient.
> + */
> + if ((end > (void *)0x100000000ULL) && (base >= (void *)0x100000000ULL)) {
Better to put the cast on the pointers, given that we are doing
arithmetic, and use SZ_4G instead of open coding this constant 4
times.
> + if (allow_hi) {
> + if (end >= (void *)(os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_base +
> + os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_size))
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR);
> + } else {
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_ABOVE_4GB);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (end >= (void *)os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_lo_size)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Some MSRs are modified by the pre-launch code including the MTRRs.
> + * The early MLE code has to restore these values. This code validates
> + * the values after they are measured.
> + */
> +static void sl_txt_validate_msrs(struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data)
> +{
> + struct slr_txt_mtrr_state *saved_bsp_mtrrs;
> + u64 mtrr_caps, mtrr_def_type, mtrr_var;
> + struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
> + u64 misc_en_msr;
> + u32 vcnt, i;
> +
> + txt_info = (struct slr_entry_intel_info *)os_mle_data->txt_info;
> + saved_bsp_mtrrs = &txt_info->saved_bsp_mtrrs;
> +
> + mtrr_caps = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRcap);
> + vcnt = (u32)(mtrr_caps & CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK);
> +
> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > vcnt)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT);
> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > TXT_OS_MLE_MAX_VARIABLE_MTRRS)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT);
> +
> + mtrr_def_type = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType);
> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->default_mem_type != mtrr_def_type)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_DEF_TYPE);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt; i++) {
> + mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(i));
> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physbase != mtrr_var)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_BASE);
> + mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(i));
> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physmask != mtrr_var)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_MASK);
> + }
> +
> + misc_en_msr = sl_rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE);
> + if (txt_info->saved_misc_enable_msr != misc_en_msr)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MSR_INV_MISC_EN);
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_find_drtm_event_log(struct slr_table *slrt)
> +{
> + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
> + struct slr_entry_log_info *log_info;
> + void *txt_heap;
> +
> + log_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_LOG_INFO);
> + if (!log_info)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY);
> +
> + evtlog_base = (void *)log_info->addr;
> + evtlog_size = log_info->size;
> +
> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
> +
> + /*
> + * For TPM 2.0, the event log 2.1 extended data structure has to also
> + * be located and fixed up.
> + */
> + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
> +
> + /*
> + * Only support version 6 and later that properly handle the
> + * list of ExtDataElements in the OS-SINIT structure.
> + */
> + if (os_sinit_data->version < 6)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_OS_SINIT_BAD_VERSION);
> +
> + /* Find the TPM2.0 logging extended heap element */
> + log20_elem = tpm20_find_log2_1_element(os_sinit_data);
> +
> + /* If found, this implies TPM20 log and family */
> + if (log20_elem)
> + tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM20_LOG;
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_validate_event_log_buffer(void)
> +{
> + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
> + void *txt_heap, *txt_end;
> + void *mle_base, *mle_end;
> + void *evtlog_end;
> +
> + if ((u64)evtlog_size > (LLONG_MAX - (u64)evtlog_base))
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW);
> + evtlog_end = evtlog_base + evtlog_size;
> +
> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
> + txt_end = txt_heap + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_SIZE);
> + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
> +
> + mle_base = (void *)(u64)sl_mle_start;
> + mle_end = mle_base + os_sinit_data->mle_size;
> +
> + /*
> + * This check is to ensure the event log buffer does not overlap with
> + * the MLE image.
> + */
> + if (evtlog_base >= mle_end && evtlog_end > mle_end)
> + goto pmr_check; /* above */
> +
> + if (evtlog_end <= mle_base && evtlog_base < mle_base)
> + goto pmr_check; /* below */
> +
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP);
> +
> +pmr_check:
> + /*
> + * The TXT heap is protected by the DPR. If the TPM event log is
> + * inside the TXT heap, there is no need for a PMR check.
> + */
> + if (evtlog_base > txt_heap && evtlog_end < txt_end)
> + return;
> +
> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, true);
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_find_event_log_algorithms(void)
> +{
> + struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *efi_head =
> + (struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *)(evtlog_base +
> + log20_elem->first_record_offset +
> + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event));
> +
> + if (efi_head->num_algs == 0 || efi_head->num_algs > 2)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_NUMBER_ALGS);
> +
> + memcpy(&tpm_algs[0], &efi_head->digest_sizes[0],
> + sizeof(struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs) * efi_head->num_algs);
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_tpm12_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type,
> + const u8 *data, u32 length,
> + const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size)
> +{
> + u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
> + u8 log_buf[SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE] = {0};
> + struct tcg_pcr_event *pcr_event;
> + u32 total_size;
> +
> + pcr_event = (struct tcg_pcr_event *)log_buf;
> + pcr_event->pcr_idx = pcr;
> + pcr_event->event_type = event_type;
> + if (length > 0) {
> + sha1(data, length, &sha1_hash[0]);
> + memcpy(&pcr_event->digest[0], &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + }
> + pcr_event->event_size = event_size;
> + if (event_size > 0)
> + memcpy((u8 *)pcr_event + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event),
> + event_data, event_size);
> +
> + total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + event_size;
> +
> + if (tpm12_log_event(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, total_size, pcr_event))
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED);
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_tpm20_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type,
> + const u8 *data, u32 length,
> + const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size)
> +{
> + u8 sha256_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
> + u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
> + u8 log_buf[SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE] = {0};
> + struct sha256_state sctx256 = {0};
> + struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *head;
> + struct tcg_event_field *event;
> + u32 total_size;
> + u16 *alg_ptr;
> + u8 *dgst_ptr;
> +
> + head = (struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *)log_buf;
> + head->pcr_idx = pcr;
> + head->event_type = event_type;
> + total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head);
> + alg_ptr = (u16 *)(log_buf + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head));
> +
> + for ( ; head->count < 2; head->count++) {
> + if (!tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id)
> + break;
> +
> + *alg_ptr = tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id;
> + dgst_ptr = (u8 *)alg_ptr + sizeof(u16);
> +
> + if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256 &&
> + length) {
> + sha256_init(&sctx256);
> + sha256_update(&sctx256, data, length);
> + sha256_final(&sctx256, &sha256_hash[0]);
> + } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1 &&
> + length) {
> + sha1(data, length, &sha1_hash[0]);
> + }
> +
> + if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256) {
> + memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha256_hash[0], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + total_size += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16);
> + alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16));
> + } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1) {
> + memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + total_size += SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16);
> + alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16));
> + } else {
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + event = (struct tcg_event_field *)(log_buf + total_size);
> + event->event_size = event_size;
> + if (event_size > 0)
> + memcpy((u8 *)event + sizeof(struct tcg_event_field), event_data, event_size);
> + total_size += sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + event_size;
> +
> + if (tpm20_log_event(log20_elem, evtlog_base, evtlog_size, total_size, &log_buf[0]))
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED);
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(u32 pcr, u32 type,
> + const u8 *data, u32 length, const char *desc)
> +{
> + if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG)
> + sl_tpm20_log_event(pcr, type, data, length,
> + (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc));
> + else
> + sl_tpm12_log_event(pcr, type, data, length,
> + (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc));
> +}
> +
> +static struct setup_data *sl_handle_setup_data(struct setup_data *curr,
> + struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
> +{
> + struct setup_indirect *ind;
> + struct setup_data *next;
> +
> + if (!curr)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + next = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)curr->next;
> +
> + /* SETUP_INDIRECT instances have to be handled differently */
> + if (curr->type == SETUP_INDIRECT) {
> + ind = (struct setup_indirect *)((u8 *)curr + offsetof(struct setup_data, data));
> +
> + sl_check_pmr_coverage((void *)ind->addr, ind->len, true);
> +
> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
> + (void *)ind->addr, ind->len,
> + entry->evt_info);
> +
> + return next;
> + }
> +
> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(((u8 *)curr) + sizeof(struct setup_data),
> + curr->len, true);
> +
> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
> + ((u8 *)curr) + sizeof(struct setup_data),
> + curr->len,
> + entry->evt_info);
> +
> + return next;
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_extend_setup_data(struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
> +{
> + struct setup_data *data;
> +
> + /*
> + * Measuring the boot params measured the fixed e820 memory map.
> + * Measure any setup_data entries including e820 extended entries.
> + */
> + data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)entry->entity;
> + while (data)
> + data = sl_handle_setup_data(data, entry);
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_extend_slrt(struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
> +{
> + struct slr_table *slrt = (struct slr_table *)entry->entity;
> + struct slr_entry_intel_info *intel_info;
> +
> + /*
> + * In revision one of the SLRT, the only table that needs to be
> + * measured is the Intel info table. Everything else is meta-data,
> + * addresses and sizes. Note the size of what to measure is not set.
> + * The flag SLR_POLICY_IMPLICIT_SIZE leaves it to the measuring code
> + * to sort out.
> + */
> + if (slrt->revision == 1) {
> + intel_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
> + if (!intel_info)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY);
> +
> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
> + (void *)entry->entity, sizeof(struct slr_entry_intel_info),
> + entry->evt_info);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_extend_txt_os2mle(struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
> +{
> + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
> + void *txt_heap;
> +
> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
> + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
> +
> + /*
> + * Version 1 of the OS-MLE heap structure has no fields to measure. It just
> + * has addresses and sizes and a scratch buffer.
> + */
> + if (os_mle_data->version == 1)
> + return;
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_process_extend_policy(struct slr_table *slrt)
> +{
> + struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
> + u16 i;
> +
> + policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
> + if (!policy)
> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) {
> + switch (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type) {
> + case SLR_ET_SETUP_DATA:
> + sl_extend_setup_data(&policy->policy_entries[i]);
> + break;
> + case SLR_ET_SLRT:
> + sl_extend_slrt(&policy->policy_entries[i]);
> + break;
> + case SLR_ET_TXT_OS2MLE:
> + sl_extend_txt_os2mle(&policy->policy_entries[i]);
> + break;
> + case SLR_ET_UNUSED:
> + continue;
> + default:
> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(policy->policy_entries[i].pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
> + (void *)policy->policy_entries[i].entity,
> + policy->policy_entries[i].size,
> + policy->policy_entries[i].evt_info);
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void sl_process_extend_uefi_config(struct slr_table *slrt)
> +{
> + struct slr_entry_uefi_config *uefi_config;
> + u16 i;
> +
> + uefi_config = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_UEFI_CONFIG);
> +
> + /* Optionally here depending on how SL kernel was booted */
> + if (!uefi_config)
> + return;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < uefi_config->nr_entries; i++) {
> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(uefi_config->uefi_cfg_entries[i].pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
> + (void *)uefi_config->uefi_cfg_entries[i].cfg,
> + uefi_config->uefi_cfg_entries[i].size,
> + uefi_config->uefi_cfg_entries[i].evt_info);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +asmlinkage __visible void sl_check_region(void *base, u32 size)
> +{
> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(base, size, false);
> +}
> +
> +asmlinkage __visible void sl_main(void *bootparams)
> +{
> + struct boot_params *bp = (struct boot_params *)bootparams;
> + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
> + struct slr_table *slrt;
> + void *txt_heap;
> +
> + /*
> + * Ensure loadflags do not indicate a secure launch was done
> + * unless it really was.
> + */
> + bp->hdr.loadflags &= ~SLAUNCH_FLAG;
> +
> + /*
> + * Currently only Intel TXT is supported for Secure Launch. Testing
> + * this value also indicates that the kernel was booted successfully
> + * through the Secure Launch entry point and is in SMX mode.
> + */
> + if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL))
> + return;
> +
> + slrt = sl_locate_and_validate_slrt();
> +
> + /* Locate the TPM event log. */
> + sl_find_drtm_event_log(slrt);
> +
> + /* Validate the location of the event log buffer before using it */
> + sl_validate_event_log_buffer();
> +
> + /*
> + * Find the TPM hash algorithms used by the ACM and recorded in the
> + * event log.
> + */
> + if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG)
> + sl_find_event_log_algorithms();
> +
> + /*
> + * Sanitize them before measuring. Set the SLAUNCH_FLAG early since if
> + * anything fails, the system will reset anyway.
> + */
> + sanitize_boot_params(bp);
> + bp->hdr.loadflags |= SLAUNCH_FLAG;
> +
> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(bootparams, PAGE_SIZE, false);
> +
> + /* Place event log SL specific tags before and after measurements */
> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_START, NULL, 0, "");
> +
> + /* Process all policy entries and extend the measurements to the evtlog */
> + sl_process_extend_policy(slrt);
> +
> + /* Process all EFI config entries and extend the measurements to the evtlog */
> + sl_process_extend_uefi_config(slrt);
> +
> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_END, NULL, 0, "");
> +
> + /* No PMR check is needed, the TXT heap is covered by the DPR */
> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
> + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
> +
> + /*
> + * Now that the OS-MLE data is measured, ensure the MTRR and
> + * misc enable MSRs are what we expect.
> + */
> + sl_txt_validate_msrs(os_mle_data);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..24b8f23d5dcc
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
> @@ -0,0 +1,725 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +/*
> + * Secure Launch protected mode entry point.
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2024, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
> + */
> + .code32
> + .text
> +#include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <asm/segment.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/apicdef.h>
> +#include <asm/trapnr.h>
> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
> +#include <asm/page_types.h>
> +#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
> +
> +/* CPUID: leaf 1, ECX, SMX feature bit */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX (1 << 6)
> +
> +#define IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS 0
> +#define IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS 6
> +
> +/*
> + * See the comment in head_64.S for detailed information on what this macro
> + * and others like it are used for. The comment appears right at the top of
> + * the file.
> + */
> +#define rva(X) ((X) - sl_stub_entry)
> +
> +/*
> + * The GETSEC op code is open coded because older versions of
> + * GCC do not support the getsec mnemonic.
> + */
> +.macro GETSEC leaf
> + pushl %ebx
> + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* Must be zero for SMCTRL */
> + movl \leaf, %eax /* Leaf function */
> + .byte 0x0f, 0x37 /* GETSEC opcode */
> + popl %ebx
> +.endm
> +
> +.macro TXT_RESET error
> + /*
> + * Set a sticky error value and reset. Note the movs to %eax act as
> + * TXT register barriers.
> + */
> + movl \error, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE)
> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
> + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS)
> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
> + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG)
> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
> + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_RESET)
> +1:
> + hlt
> + jmp 1b
> +.endm
> +
> + .code32
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_stub_entry)
> + cli
> + cld
> +
> + /*
> + * On entry, %ebx has the entry abs offset to sl_stub_entry. This
> + * will be correctly scaled using the rva macro and avoid causing
> + * relocations. Only %cs and %ds segments are known good.
Could you please clarify this? 'scaling' is unidiomatic in this
context, and actually means something different in my book. AIUI, %ebx
is guaranteed to carry the actual address of sl_stub_entry(), and
rva() is used to generate relative references using %ebx as a base, as
to avoid /absolute/ relocations, which would require fixups at
runtime.
> + */
> +
> + /* Load GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */
> + leal rva(sl_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
> + addl %eax, 2(%eax)
> + lgdt (%eax)
> +
> + movl $(__SL32_DS), %eax
> + movw %ax, %ds
> + movw %ax, %es
> + movw %ax, %fs
> + movw %ax, %gs
> + movw %ax, %ss
> +
> + /*
> + * Now that %ss is known good, take the first stack for the BSP. The
> + * AP stacks are only used on Intel.
> + */
> + leal rva(sl_stacks_end)(%ebx), %esp
> +
> + leal rva(.Lsl_cs)(%ebx), %eax
> + pushl $(__SL32_CS)
> + pushl %eax
> + lret
> +
> +.Lsl_cs:
> + /* Save our base pointer reg and page table for MLE */
> + pushl %ebx
> + pushl %ecx
> +
> + /* See if SMX feature is supported. */
> + movl $1, %eax
> + cpuid
> + testl $(X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX), %ecx
> + jz .Ldo_unknown_cpu
> +
> + popl %ecx
> + popl %ebx
> +
> + /* Know it is Intel */
> + movl $(SL_CPU_INTEL), rva(sl_cpu_type)(%ebx)
> +
> + /* Locate the base of the MLE using the page tables in %ecx */
> + call sl_find_mle_base
> +
> + /* Increment CPU count for BSP */
> + incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx)
> +
> + /*
> + * Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] which were disabled by SENTER.
> + * NMIs were also disabled by SENTER. Since there is no IDT for the BSP,
> + * allow the mainline kernel re-enable them in the normal course of
> + * booting.
> + */
> + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
> +
> + /* Clear the TXT error registers for a clean start of day */
> + movl $0, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE)
> + movl $0xffffffff, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ESTS)
> +
> + /* On Intel, the zero page address is passed in the TXT heap */
> + /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */
> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
> + /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */
> + movl (%eax), %ecx
> + /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */
> + leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax
> +
> + /* Need to verify the values in the OS-MLE struct passed in */
> + call sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct
> +
> + /*
> + * Get the boot params address from the heap. Note %esi and %ebx MUST
> + * be preserved across calls and operations.
> + */
> + movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %esi
> +
> + /* Save %ebx so the APs can find their way home */
> + movl %ebx, (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax)
> +
> + /* Fetch the AP wake code block address from the heap */
> + movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %edi
> + movl %edi, rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx)
> +
> + /* Store the offset in the AP wake block to the jmp address */
> + movl $(sl_ap_jmp_offset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
> + (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_JMP_OFFSET)(%eax)
> +
> + /* Store the offset in the AP wake block to the AP stacks block */
> + movl $(sl_stacks - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
> + (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_STACKS_OFFSET)(%eax)
> +
> + /* %eax still is the base of the OS-MLE block, save it */
> + pushl %eax
> +
> + /* Relocate the AP wake code to the safe block */
> + call sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake
> +
> + /*
> + * Wake up all APs that are blocked in the ACM and wait for them to
> + * halt. This should be done before restoring the MTRRs so the ACM is
> + * still properly in WB memory.
> + */
> + call sl_txt_wake_aps
> +
> + /* Restore OS-MLE in %eax */
> + popl %eax
> +
> + /*
> + * %edi is used by this routine to find the MTRRs which are in the SLRT
> + * in the Intel info.
> + */
> + movl SL_txt_info(%eax), %edi
> + call sl_txt_load_regs
> +
> + jmp .Lcpu_setup_done
> +
> +.Ldo_unknown_cpu:
> + /* Non-Intel CPUs are not yet supported */
> + ud2
> +
> +.Lcpu_setup_done:
> + /*
> + * Don't enable MCE at this point. The kernel will enable
> + * it on the BSP later when it is ready.
> + */
> +
> + /* Done, jump to normal 32b pm entry */
> + jmp startup_32
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_stub_entry)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_find_mle_base)
> + /* %ecx has PDPT, get first PD */
> + movl (%ecx), %eax
> + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax
> + /* Get first PT from first PDE */
> + movl (%eax), %eax
> + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax
> + /* Get MLE base from first PTE */
> + movl (%eax), %eax
> + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax
> +
> + movl %eax, rva(sl_mle_start)(%ebx)
> + ret
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_find_mle_base)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap)
> + /* %ecx: buffer begin %edx: buffer end */
> + /* %ebx: MLE begin %edi: MLE end */
> + /* %eax: region may be inside MLE */
> +
> + cmpl %edi, %ecx
> + jb .Lnext_check
> + cmpl %edi, %edx
> + jbe .Lnext_check
> + jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer above MLE */
> +
> +.Lnext_check:
> + cmpl %ebx, %edx
> + ja .Linside_check
> + cmpl %ebx, %ecx
> + jae .Linside_check
> + jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer below MLE */
> +
> +.Linside_check:
> + cmpl $0, %eax
> + jz .Linvalid
> + cmpl %ebx, %ecx
> + jb .Linvalid
> + cmpl %edi, %edx
> + ja .Linvalid
> + jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer in MLE */
> +
> +.Linvalid:
> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP)
> +
> +.Lvalid:
> + ret
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct)
> + pushl %ebx
> + /*
> + * %eax points to the base of the OS-MLE struct. Need to also
> + * read some values from the OS-SINIT struct too.
> + */
> + movl -8(%eax), %ecx
> + /* Skip over OS to MLE data section and size of OS-SINIT structure */
> + leal (%eax, %ecx), %edx
> +
> + /* Load MLE image base absolute offset */
> + movl rva(sl_mle_start)(%ebx), %ebx
> +
> + /* Verify the value of the low PMR base. It should always be 0. */
> + movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base(%edx), %esi
> + cmpl $0, %esi
> + jz .Lvalid_pmr_base
> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_LO_PMR_BASE)
> +
> +.Lvalid_pmr_base:
> + /* Grab some values from OS-SINIT structure */
> + movl SL_mle_size(%edx), %edi
> + addl %ebx, %edi
> + jc .Loverflow_detected
> + movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size(%edx), %esi
> +
> + /* Check the AP wake block */
> + movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %ecx
> + movl SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax), %edx
> + addl %ecx, %edx
> + jc .Loverflow_detected
> + pushl %eax
> + xorl %eax, %eax
> + call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap
> + popl %eax
> + cmpl %esi, %edx
> + ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr
> +
> + /*
> + * Check the boot params. Note during a UEFI boot, the boot
> + * params will be inside the MLE image. Test for this case
> + * in the overlap case.
> + */
> + movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %ecx
> + movl $(PAGE_SIZE), %edx
> + addl %ecx, %edx
> + jc .Loverflow_detected
> + pushl %eax
> + movl $1, %eax
> + call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap
> + popl %eax
> + cmpl %esi, %edx
> + ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr
> +
> + /* Check that the AP wake block is big enough */
> + cmpl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
> + SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax)
> + jae .Lwake_block_ok
> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_WAKE_BLOCK_TOO_SMALL)
> +
> +.Lwake_block_ok:
> + popl %ebx
> + ret
> +
> +.Loverflow_detected:
> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW)
> +
> +.Lbuffer_beyond_pmr:
> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR)
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_ap_entry)
> + cli
> + cld
> + /*
> + * The %cs and %ds segments are known good after waking the AP.
> + * First order of business is to find where we are and
> + * save it in %ebx.
> + */
> +
> + /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */
> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
> + /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */
> + movl (%eax), %ecx
> + /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */
> + leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax
> +
> + /* Saved %ebx from the BSP and stash OS-MLE pointer */
> + movl (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax), %ebx
> +
> + /* Save TXT info ptr in %edi for call to sl_txt_load_regs */
> + movl SL_txt_info(%eax), %edi
> +
> + /* Lock and get our stack index */
> + movl $1, %ecx
> +.Lspin:
> + xorl %eax, %eax
> + lock cmpxchgl %ecx, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx)
> + pause
> + jnz .Lspin
> +
> + /* Increment the stack index and use the next value inside lock */
> + incl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx)
> + movl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx), %eax
> +
> + /* Unlock */
> + movl $0, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx)
> +
> + /* Location of the relocated AP wake block */
> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx
> +
> + /* Load reloc GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */
> + lgdt (sl_ap_gdt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
> +
> + movl $(__SL32_DS), %edx
> + movw %dx, %ds
> + movw %dx, %es
> + movw %dx, %fs
> + movw %dx, %gs
> + movw %dx, %ss
> +
> + /* Load our reloc AP stack */
> + movl $(TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), %edx
> + mull %edx
> + leal (sl_stacks_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx), %esp
> + subl %eax, %esp
> +
> + /* Switch to AP code segment */
> + leal rva(.Lsl_ap_cs)(%ebx), %eax
> + pushl $(__SL32_CS)
> + pushl %eax
> + lret
> +
> +.Lsl_ap_cs:
> + /* Load the relocated AP IDT */
> + lidt (sl_ap_idt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
> +
> + /* Fixup MTRRs and misc enable MSR on APs too */
> + call sl_txt_load_regs
> +
> + /* Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] */
> + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
> +
> + /* IRET-to-self can be used to enable NMIs which SENTER disabled */
> + leal rva(.Lnmi_enabled_ap)(%ebx), %eax
> + pushfl
> + pushl $(__SL32_CS)
> + pushl %eax
> + iret
> +
> +.Lnmi_enabled_ap:
> + /* Put APs in X2APIC mode like the BSP */
> + movl $(MSR_IA32_APICBASE), %ecx
> + rdmsr
> + orl $(XAPIC_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE), %eax
> + wrmsr
> +
> + /*
> + * Basically done, increment the CPU count and jump off to the AP
> + * wake block to wait.
> + */
> + lock incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx)
> +
> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax
> + jmp *%eax
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_ap_entry)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake)
> + /* Save boot params register */
> + pushl %esi
> +
> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %edi
> +
> + /* Fixup AP IDT and GDT descriptor before relocating */
> + leal rva(sl_ap_idt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
> + addl %edi, 2(%eax)
> + leal rva(sl_ap_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
> + addl %edi, 2(%eax)
> +
> + /*
> + * Copy the AP wake code and AP GDT/IDT to the protected wake block
> + * provided by the loader. Destination already in %edi.
> + */
> + movl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx
> + leal rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ebx), %esi
> + rep movsb
> +
> + /* Setup the IDT for the APs to use in the relocation block */
> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx
> + addl $(sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx
> + xorl %edx, %edx
> +
> + /* Form the default reset vector relocation address */
> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %esi
> + addl $(sl_txt_int_reset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %esi
> +
> +1:
> + cmpw $(NR_VECTORS), %dx
> + jz .Lap_idt_done
> +
> + cmpw $(X86_TRAP_NMI), %dx
> + jz 2f
> +
> + /* Load all other fixed vectors with reset handler */
> + movl %esi, %eax
> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx)
> + shrl $16, %eax
> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx)
> + jmp 3f
> +
> +2:
> + /* Load single wake NMI IPI vector at the relocation address */
> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax
> + addl $(sl_txt_int_nmi - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %eax
> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx)
> + shrl $16, %eax
> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx)
> +
> +3:
> + incw %dx
> + addl $8, %ecx
> + jmp 1b
> +
> +.Lap_idt_done:
> + popl %esi
> + ret
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_load_regs)
> + /* Save base pointer register */
> + pushl %ebx
> +
> + /*
> + * On Intel, the original variable MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR are
> + * restored on the BSP at early boot. Each AP will also restore
> + * its MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR.
> + */
> + pushl %edi
> + addl $(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs), %edi
> + movl (%edi), %ebx
> + pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type lo */
> + addl $4, %edi
> + movl (%edi), %ebx
> + pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type hi */
> + addl $4, %edi
> + movl (%edi), %ebx /* mtrr_vcnt lo, don't care about hi part */
> + addl $8, %edi /* now at MTRR pair array */
> + /* Write the variable MTRRs */
> + movl $(MSR_MTRRphysBase0), %ecx
> +1:
> + cmpl $0, %ebx
> + jz 2f
> +
> + movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysBaseX lo */
> + addl $4, %edi
> + movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysBaseX hi */
> + wrmsr
> + addl $4, %edi
> + incl %ecx
> + movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysMaskX lo */
> + addl $4, %edi
> + movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysMaskX hi */
> + wrmsr
> + addl $4, %edi
> + incl %ecx
> +
> + decl %ebx
> + jmp 1b
> +2:
> + /* Write the default MTRR register */
> + popl %edx
> + popl %eax
> + movl $(MSR_MTRRdefType), %ecx
> + wrmsr
> +
> + /* Return to beginning and write the misc enable msr */
> + popl %edi
> + addl $(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr), %edi
> + movl (%edi), %eax /* saved_misc_enable_msr lo */
> + addl $4, %edi
> + movl (%edi), %edx /* saved_misc_enable_msr hi */
> + movl $(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE), %ecx
> + wrmsr
> +
> + popl %ebx
> + ret
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_load_regs)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_wake_aps)
> + /* Save boot params register */
> + pushl %esi
> +
> + /* First setup the MLE join structure and load it into TXT reg */
> + leal rva(sl_gdt)(%ebx), %eax
> + leal rva(sl_txt_ap_entry)(%ebx), %ecx
> + leal rva(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)(%ebx), %edx
> + movl %eax, SL_rlp_gdt_base(%edx)
> + movl %ecx, SL_rlp_entry_point(%edx)
> + movl %edx, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_MLE_JOIN)
> +
> + /* Another TXT heap walk to find various values needed to wake APs */
> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
> + /* At BIOS data size, find the number of logical processors */
> + movl (SL_num_logical_procs + 8)(%eax), %edx
> + /* Skip over BIOS data */
> + movl (%eax), %ecx
> + addl %ecx, %eax
> + /* Skip over OS to MLE */
> + movl (%eax), %ecx
> + addl %ecx, %eax
> + /* At OS-SNIT size, get capabilities to know how to wake up the APs */
> + movl (SL_capabilities + 8)(%eax), %esi
> + /* Skip over OS to SNIT */
> + movl (%eax), %ecx
> + addl %ecx, %eax
> + /* At SINIT-MLE size, get the AP wake MONITOR address */
> + movl (SL_rlp_wakeup_addr + 8)(%eax), %edi
> +
> + /* Determine how to wake up the APs */
> + testl $(1 << TXT_SINIT_MLE_CAP_WAKE_MONITOR), %esi
> + jz .Lwake_getsec
> +
> + /* Wake using MWAIT MONITOR */
> + movl $1, (%edi)
> + jmp .Laps_awake
> +
> +.Lwake_getsec:
> + /* Wake using GETSEC(WAKEUP) */
> + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_WAKEUP)
> +
> +.Laps_awake:
> + /*
> + * All of the APs are woken up and rendesvous in the relocated wake
> + * block starting at sl_txt_ap_wake_begin. Wait for all of them to
> + * halt.
> + */
> + pause
> + cmpl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx), %edx
> + jne .Laps_awake
> +
> + popl %esi
> + ret
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_wake_aps)
> +
> +/* This is the beginning of the relocated AP wake code block */
> + .global sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
> +sl_txt_ap_wake_begin:
> +
> + /* Get the LAPIC ID for each AP and stash it on the stack */
> + movl $(MSR_IA32_X2APIC_APICID), %ecx
> + rdmsr
> + pushl %eax
> +
> + /*
> + * Get a pointer to the monitor location on this APs stack to test below
> + * after mwait returns. Currently %esp points to just past the pushed APIC
> + * ID value.
> + */
> + movl %esp, %eax
> + subl $(TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE - 4), %eax
> + movl $0, (%eax)
> +
> + /* Clear ecx/edx so no invalid extensions or hints are passed to monitor */
> + xorl %ecx, %ecx
> + xorl %edx, %edx
> +
> + /*
> + * Arm the monitor and wait for it to be poked by he SMP bringup code. The mwait
> + * instruction can return for a number of reasons. Test to see if it returned
> + * because the monitor was written to.
> + */
> + monitor
> +
> +1:
> + mfence
> + mwait
> + movl (%eax), %edx
> + testl %edx, %edx
> + jz 1b
> +
> + /*
> + * This is the long absolute jump to the 32b Secure Launch protected mode stub
> + * code in sl_trampoline_start32() in the rmpiggy. The jump address will be
> + * fixed in the SMP boot code when the first AP is brought up. This whole area
> + * is provided and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code.
> + */
> + .byte 0xea
> +sl_ap_jmp_offset:
> + .long 0x00000000
> + .word __SL32_CS
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_nmi)
> + /* NMI context, just IRET */
> + iret
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_nmi)
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_reset)
> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INV_AP_INTERRUPT)
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_reset)
> +
> + .balign 8
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt_desc)
> + .word sl_ap_idt_end - sl_ap_idt - 1 /* Limit */
> + .long sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin /* Base */
> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_desc_end)
> +
> + .balign 8
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt)
> + .rept NR_VECTORS
> + .word 0x0000 /* Offset 15 to 0 */
> + .word __SL32_CS /* Segment selector */
> + .word 0x8e00 /* Present, DPL=0, 32b Vector, Interrupt */
> + .word 0x0000 /* Offset 31 to 16 */
> + .endr
> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_end)
> +
> + .balign 8
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt_desc)
> + .word sl_ap_gdt_end - sl_ap_gdt - 1
> + .long sl_ap_gdt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_desc_end)
> +
> + .balign 8
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt)
> + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */
> + .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */
> + .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */
> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_end)
> +
> + /* Small stacks for BSP and APs to work with */
> + .balign 64
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_stacks)
> + .fill (TXT_MAX_CPUS * TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), 1, 0
> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_stacks, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_stacks_end)
> +
> +/* This is the end of the relocated AP wake code block */
> + .global sl_txt_ap_wake_end
> +sl_txt_ap_wake_end:
> +
> + .data
> + .balign 8
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt_desc)
> + .word sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1
> + .long sl_gdt - sl_gdt_desc
> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_desc_end)
> +
> + .balign 8
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt)
> + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */
> + .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */
> + .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */
> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_end)
> +
> + .balign 8
> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)
> + .long sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1 /* GDT limit */
> + .long 0x00000000 /* GDT base */
> + .long __SL32_CS /* Seg Sel - CS (DS, ES, SS = seg_sel+8) */
> + .long 0x00000000 /* Entry point physical address */
> +SYM_DATA_END(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)
> +
> +SYM_DATA(sl_cpu_type, .long 0x00000000)
> +
> +SYM_DATA(sl_mle_start, .long 0x00000000)
> +
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_spin_lock, .long 0x00000000)
> +
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_stack_index, .long 0x00000000)
> +
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_cpu_count, .long 0x00000000)
> +
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_ap_wake_block, .long 0x00000000)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index e022e6eb766c..37f6167f28ba 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -348,6 +348,9 @@
> #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE 0x00000560
> #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK 0x00000561
>
> +#define MSR_MTRRphysBase0 0x00000200
> +#define MSR_MTRRphysMask0 0x00000201
> +
> #define MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 0x00000250
> #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 0x00000258
> #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000 0x00000259
> @@ -849,6 +852,8 @@
> #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE (1<<11)
> #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12)
>
> +#define MSR_IA32_X2APIC_APICID 0x00000802
> +
> #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079
> #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
> index 9b82eebd7add..7ce283a22d6b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> /* loadflags */
> #define LOADED_HIGH (1<<0)
> #define KASLR_FLAG (1<<1)
> +#define SLAUNCH_FLAG (1<<2)
> #define QUIET_FLAG (1<<5)
> #define KEEP_SEGMENTS (1<<6)
> #define CAN_USE_HEAP (1<<7)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> index a98020bf31bb..925adce6e2c7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
> #include <linux/hardirq.h>
> #include <linux/suspend.h>
> #include <linux/kbuild.h>
> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> #include <asm/thread_info.h>
> #include <asm/sigframe.h>
> @@ -120,4 +122,22 @@ static void __used common(void)
> OFFSET(ARIA_CTX_rounds, aria_ctx, rounds);
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> + BLANK();
> + OFFSET(SL_txt_info, txt_os_mle_data, txt_info);
> + OFFSET(SL_mle_scratch, txt_os_mle_data, mle_scratch);
> + OFFSET(SL_boot_params_addr, txt_os_mle_data, boot_params_addr);
> + OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block);
> + OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block_size, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block_size);
> + OFFSET(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr, slr_entry_intel_info, saved_misc_enable_msr);
> + OFFSET(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs, slr_entry_intel_info, saved_bsp_mtrrs);
> + OFFSET(SL_num_logical_procs, txt_bios_data, num_logical_procs);
> + OFFSET(SL_capabilities, txt_os_sinit_data, capabilities);
> + OFFSET(SL_mle_size, txt_os_sinit_data, mle_size);
> + OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_base);
> + OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_size);
> + OFFSET(SL_rlp_wakeup_addr, txt_sinit_mle_data, rlp_wakeup_addr);
> + OFFSET(SL_rlp_gdt_base, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_gdt_base);
> + OFFSET(SL_rlp_entry_point, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_entry_point);
> +#endif
> }
> --
> 2.39.3
>