Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to change ID_AA64PFR1_EL1

From: Shaoqin Huang
Date: Thu Jul 18 2024 - 04:22:01 EST


Hi Oliver,

On 7/18/24 14:35, Oliver Upton wrote:
On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 11:50:15PM -0400, Shaoqin Huang wrote:
Allow userspace to change the guest-visible value of the register with
different way of handling:

- Since the RAS and MPAM is not writable in the ID_AA64PFR0_EL1
register, RAS_frac and MPAM_frac are also not writable in the
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 register.

- The MTE is controlled by an internal flag (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED),
so it's not writable.

The flag isn't the relevant part, what's important about MTE is that it
already has a separate UAPI for controlling it (KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE).

I'm not quite understand why KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED isn't the relevant part. I see this capability, when enable the KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE, it set the KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED in the kvm->arch.flags.

And do you mean we should update it like "The MTE is controlled by a UAPI (KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE)"?


- For those fields which KVM doesn't know how to handle, they have
are not exposed to the guest (being disabled in the register read
accessor), those fields value will always be 0. Allow those fields
writable is fine, since the userspace can only write 0 into those
fields. Maybe in the future KVM know how to handle some of the
fields, then they can be written into other value.
So let them writable.
Those fields include SME, RNDR_trap, NMI, GCS, THE, DF2, PFAR,
MTE_frac, MTEX.

This doesn't seem right. We're committing to a UAPI behavior the moment
these fields are advertised to userspace, which is rather difficult to
do for features that we don't even implement.

Please only advertise the fields known to KVM and leave the others
unadvertised.

Thanks a lot for pointing this out. Now I get the point, for those not implemented feature, they should not writable, so they're not advertised to userspace.


- The BT, SSBS, CSV2_frac don't introduce any new registers which KVM
doesn't know how to handle, they can be written without ill effect.
So let them writable.

I think the handling of ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 needs to be updated
to consider the presence of FEAT_SSBS in the guest's ID registers.
Otherwise we'll wind up returning NOT_SUPPORTED and the guest will
conclude it is in a vulnerable state.

I see that line of code, in the case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:

if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
break;

I guess we should update it with something like

if (SYS_FIELD_GET(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, IDREG(kvm,
SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1)) != 0)

Oliver, Is there any proper function or macro implement the checking like above? I don't find the similar checking in the code.

Thanks,
Shaoqin



--
Shaoqin