[PATCH v3] proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes

[Adrian Ratiu]

This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing
the FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because
it can be abused.

The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because
it can break GDB and some other use cases.

Previously we tried a more sophisticated approach allowing
distributions to fine-tune /proc/pid/mem behavior, however
that got NAK-ed by Linus [1], who prefers this simpler
approach with semantics also easier to understand for users.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiGWLChxYmUA5HrT5aopZrB7_2VTa0NLZcxORgkUe5tEQ@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ [1]
Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes in v3:
* Simplified code to use shorthand ifs and a
  lookup_constant() table.

Changes in v2:
* Added bootparam on top of Linus' patch.
* Slightly reworded commit msg.
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 10 ++++
 fs/proc/base.c                                | 54 ++++++++++++++++++-
 security/Kconfig                              | 32 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index c1134ad5f06d..793301f360ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4791,6 +4791,16 @@
 	printk.time=	Show timing data prefixed to each printk message line
 			Format: <bool>  (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable)
 
+	proc_mem.force_override= [KNL]
+			Format: {always | ptrace | never}
+			Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
+			permissions. This allows people to limit that.
+			Can be one of:
+			- 'always' traditional behavior always allows mem overrides.
+			- 'ptrace' only allow for active ptracers.
+			- 'never'  never allow mem permission overrides.
+			If not specified, default is always.
+
 	processor.max_cstate=	[HW,ACPI]
 			Limit processor to maximum C-state
 			max_cstate=9 overrides any DMI blacklist limit.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 72a1acd03675..0ca3fc3d9e0e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
@@ -117,6 +118,35 @@
 static u8 nlink_tid __ro_after_init;
 static u8 nlink_tgid __ro_after_init;
 
+enum proc_mem_force {
+	PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS,
+	PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE,
+	PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER
+};
+
+static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS :
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE :
+	PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER;
+
+struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] = {
+	{ "always", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS },
+	{ "ptrace", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE },
+	{ }
+};
+
+static int __init early_proc_mem_force_override(char *buf)
+{
+	if (!buf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	proc_mem_force_override = lookup_constant(proc_mem_force_table,
+						  buf, PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("proc_mem.force_override", early_proc_mem_force_override);
+
 struct pid_entry {
 	const char *name;
 	unsigned int len;
@@ -835,6 +865,26 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	switch (proc_mem_force_override) {
+	case PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER:
+		return false;
+	case PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE: {
+		bool ptrace_active = false;
+		struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
+
+		if (task) {
+			ptrace_active = task->ptrace && task->mm == mm && task->parent == current;
+			put_task_struct(task);
+		}
+		return ptrace_active;
+	}
+	default:
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+
 static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)
 {
@@ -855,7 +905,9 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
 		goto free;
 
-	flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0);
+	flags = write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0;
+	if (proc_mem_foll_force(file, mm))
+		flags |= FOLL_FORCE;
 
 	while (count > 0) {
 		size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE);
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 412e76f1575d..a93c1a9b7c28 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -19,6 +19,38 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+choice
+	prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
+	default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
+	help
+	  Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
+	  permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
+	  capability.
+
+	  This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
+	  require actual active ptrace attachment.
+
+	  Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now)
+
+config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
+	bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
+	help
+	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
+	  permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
+
+config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
+	bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
+	help
+	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
+	  permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
+
+config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
+	bool "Never"
+	help
+	  Never override memory mapping permissions
+
+endchoice
+
 config SECURITY
 	bool "Enable different security models"
 	depends on SYSFS
-- 
2.44.2