RE: [PATCH RFC 0/5] mm/gup: Introduce exclusive GUP pinning

[Tian, Kevin]

> From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2024 10:34 PM
> 
> On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 04:14:23PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> 
> > 1) How would the device be able to grab/access "private memory", if not
> >    via the user page tables?
> 
> The approaches I'm aware of require the secure world to own the IOMMU
> and generate the IOMMU page tables. So we will not use a GUP approach
> with VFIO today as the kernel will not have any reason to generate a
> page table in the first place. Instead we will say "this PCI device
> translates through the secure world" and walk away.
> 
> The page table population would have to be done through the KVM path.
> 

Sorry for noting this discussion late. Dave pointed it to me in a related
thread [1].

I had an impression that above approach fits some trusted IO arch (e.g.
TDX Connect which has a special secure I/O page table format and
requires sharing it between IOMMU/KVM) but not all.

e.g. SEV-TIO spec [2] (page 8) describes to have the IOMMU walk the
existing I/O page tables to get HPA and then verify it through a new
permission table (RMP) for access control.

That arch may better fit a scheme in which the I/O page tables are
still managed by VFIO/IOMMUFD and RMP is managed by KVM, with an
an extension to the MAP_DMA call to accept a [guest_memfd, offset]
pair to find out the pfn instead of using host virtual address.

looks the Linux MM alignment session [3] did mention "guest_memfd
will take ownership of the hugepages, and provide interested parties
(userspace, KVM, iommu) with pages to be used" to support that extension?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/272e3dbf-ed4a-43f5-8b5f-56bf6d74930c@xxxxxxxxxx/
[2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/documents/sev-tio-whitepaper.pdf
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240712232937.2861788-1-ackerleytng@xxxxxxxxxx/

Thanks
Kevin