Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/tdx: Add validation of userspace MMIO instructions

[Alexey Gladkov]

On Tue, Aug 06, 2024 at 10:18:20AM +0300, kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 05, 2024 at 10:40:55PM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > On Mon, 2024-08-05 at 15:29 +0200, Alexey Gladkov (Intel) wrote:
> > > +       vaddr = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
> > > +
> > > +       if (user_mode(regs)) {
> > > +               if (mmap_read_lock_killable(current->mm))
> > > +                       return -EINTR;
> > > +
> > > +               ret = valid_vaddr(ve, mmio, size, vaddr);
> > > +               if (ret)
> > > +                       goto unlock;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > 
> > In the case of user MMIO, if the user instruction + MAX_INSN_SIZE straddles a
> > page, then the "fetch" in the kernel could trigger a #VE. In this case the  
> > kernel would handle this second #VE as a !user_mode() MMIO I guess.
> > 
> > Would something prevent the same munmap() checks needing to happen for that
> > second kernel #VE? If not, I wonder if the munmap() protection logic should also
> > trigger for any userspace range ve->gpa as well.
> 
> That's an interesting scenario, but I think we are fine.
> 
> The fetch is copy_from_user() which is "REP; MOVSB" on all TDX platforms.
> Kernel rejects MOVS instruction emulation for !user_mode() with -EFAULT.

But MOVS will be used only if X86_FEATURE_FSRM feature is present.
Otherwise rep_movs_alternative will be used, which uses MOVB.

I know that X86_FEATURE_FSRM appeared since Ice Lake, but still.

-- 
Rgrds, legion