[PATCH v3 07/13] LSM: Use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid

From: Casey Schaufler
Date: Tue Sep 10 2024 - 14:53:49 EST

Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-integrity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: audit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 6 +--
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++---
kernel/audit.c | 11 +++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 ++++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 59 ++++++++++++++-------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++----
security/security.c | 28 ++++++-------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 25 +++++++-----
16 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 315bbe1f63fc..e53d29c3ca1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -232,9 +232,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgroups, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getsecid_subj, u32 *secid)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
- struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getlsmprop_subj, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getlsmprop_obj,
+ struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c8f020cf2a84..07c0e635f124 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -492,8 +492,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop);
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1278,14 +1278,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}

-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmprop_init(prop);
}

-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmprop_init(prop);
}

static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 70f76fed254b..399f66557dfa 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2179,16 +2179,16 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)

int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;

- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop))
return 0;

- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -2405,8 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- /* scaffolding */
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm.scaffold.secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
}

return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 5b47571ae4ee..7589845cb9ee 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1371,8 +1371,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* scaffolding */
- security_current_getsecid_subj(
- &prop.scaffold.secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&prop, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 3e051014484c..b976b88c19c3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_prop prop = { };
unsigned int sessionid;

@@ -675,15 +674,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* fork()/copy_process() in which case
* the new @tsk creds are still a dup
* of @current's creds so we can still
- * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
+ * use
+ * security_current_getlsmprop_subj()
* here even though it always refs
* @current's creds
*/
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /* scaffolding */
- prop.scaffold.secid = sid;
result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop,
f->type,
f->op,
@@ -2730,12 +2728,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ context->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}

@@ -2751,6 +2752,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2762,7 +2764,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ ctx->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2783,7 +2787,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = prop.scaffold.secid;
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 9996883bf2b7..5925f48a3ade 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1534,11 +1534,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ audit_info.secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index d6c5b31eb4eb..39f4f6df5f51 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
*/
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ audit_info->secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ad2499bff591..824a85d2ee85 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -982,17 +982,24 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return;
}

-static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
- *secid = label->secid;
+
+ prop->apparmor.label = label;
+ /* scaffolding */
+ prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
}

-static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
- *secid = label->secid;
+
+ prop->apparmor.label = label;
+ /* scaffolding */
+ prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
aa_put_label(label);
}

@@ -1518,8 +1525,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {

LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj,
+ apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f17213520c36..791f71036893 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}

/* LIM API function definitions */
int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);

/* IMA policy related functions */
int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
- int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 984e861f6e33..c35ea613c9f8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @prop: properties of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
*
*/
int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,

flags &= ima_policy_flag;

- return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask,
flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
allowed_algos);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 656c709b974f..884a3533f7af 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;

- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop,
func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f04f43af651c..254ab465a4a6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}

static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid,
+ action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop,
mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
&allowed_algos);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
@@ -443,23 +443,23 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
int ret;

if (!file)
return 0;

- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);

if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
- ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT);
if (ret)
return ret;
}

if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);

return 0;
@@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;

/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;

- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+ current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
+ current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC,
MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL,
NULL);

@@ -542,15 +542,18 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop = { };

- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+ &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;

security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+ /* scaffolding */
+ prop.scaffold.secid = secid;
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}

@@ -566,10 +569,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -768,7 +771,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -788,9 +791,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,

/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}

const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -818,7 +821,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -831,8 +834,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
}

func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}

@@ -967,7 +970,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_prop prop;

if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -990,9 +993,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(),
- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ &prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 22a62e675ebc..a96dc3ff6aa0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
const char *func_data)
{
int i;
@@ -658,8 +658,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- /* scaffolding */
- prop.scaffold.secid = secid;
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -723,7 +721,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE)
@@ -740,8 +738,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
- int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
{
@@ -759,7 +757,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;

- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid,
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop,
func, mask, func_data))
continue;

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 410bf69af427..1e603e055c9f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -3373,33 +3373,33 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
}

/**
- * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid
- * @secid: secid value
+ * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() - Current task's subjective LSM data
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
*
* Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return
- * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * it in @prop.
*/
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+ lsmprop_init(prop);
+ call_void_hook(current_getlsmprop_subj, prop);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getlsmprop_subj);

/**
- * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid
+ * security_task_getlsmprop_obj() - Get a task's objective LSM data
* @p: target task
- * @secid: secid value
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
*
* Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and
- * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * return it in @prop.
*/
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+ lsmprop_init(prop);
+ call_void_hook(task_getlsmprop_obj, p, prop);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getlsmprop_obj);

/**
* security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 10c7fc61a786..ebab856c8748 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4161,14 +4161,19 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
}

-static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
- *secid = current_sid();
+ prop->selinux.secid = current_sid();
+ /* scaffolding */
+ prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid;
}

-static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
- *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+ prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid;
}

static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -7240,8 +7245,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 7926f40bc7db..03d0ac37b210 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2239,30 +2239,35 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
}

/**
- * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
+ * @prop: where to put the result
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
*/
-static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();

- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ prop->smack.skp = skp;
+ /* scaffolding */
+ prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid;
}

/**
- * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task
+ * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task
* @p: the task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * @prop: where to put the result
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
*/
-static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsm_prop *prop)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);

- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ prop->smack.skp = skp;
+ /* scaffolding */
+ prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid;
}

/**
@@ -5147,8 +5152,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
--
2.46.0