[RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation

From: David Kaplan
Date: Thu Sep 12 2024 - 15:09:54 EST


Restructure taa mitigation to use select/update/apply functions to
create consistent vulnerability handling.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@xxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0bdd4e5b8fc1..3c0a0890d382 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
@@ -203,8 +206,10 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
* choices.
*/
mds_update_mitigation();
+ taa_update_mitigation();

mds_apply_mitigation();
+ taa_apply_mitigation();
}

/*
@@ -369,9 +374,6 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);

-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt
-
static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;

static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -402,11 +404,13 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
/*
* TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
* tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
+ *
+ * mds mitigation will be checked in taa_update_mitigation()
*/
- if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
return;

+ /* This handles the AUTO case. */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
else
@@ -425,17 +429,38 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;

- /*
- * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
- * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
- *
- * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
- * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
- */
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+}
+
+static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ return;
+
+ if (mds_mitigation != MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ mmio_mitigation != MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ rfds_mitigation != RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_VERW ||
+ taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED) {
+ /*
+ * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+ * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+ *
+ * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+ * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+
+ if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+ }

- if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
- cpu_smt_disable(false);
}

static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -641,7 +666,6 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)

static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
{
- taa_select_mitigation();
mmio_select_mitigation();
rfds_select_mitigation();

--
2.34.1