[RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation

[David Kaplan]

Restructure spectre_v1 to use select/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@xxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 7fee5c3de135..ab49205ebb15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
  */
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -216,6 +217,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	mmio_update_mitigation();
 	rfds_update_mitigation();
 
+	spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
 	mds_apply_mitigation();
 	taa_apply_mitigation();
 	mmio_apply_mitigation();
@@ -989,11 +991,12 @@ static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
-		return;
-	}
+}
 
+static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
 	if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
 		/*
 		 * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
-- 
2.34.1