Re: [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1

[Dave Hansen]

On 9/12/24 12:57, Kaplan, David wrote:
> And to be clear, I was trying to continue to support both.  But the 
> attack-vector style is also more future-proof because when new issues 
> arise, they would get added to the appropriate vectors and users 
> wouldn't have to do anything ideally.

That's a good point.  Do you have any inkling about how static folks'
vector selection would have been over time?

For instance, if someone cared about CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST at the
original spectre_v2 time, did that carry forward to L1TF and all the way
into 2024?

Or would they have had to shift their vector selection over time?