Re: [PATCH RFC 0/3] tsm: Unified Measurement Register ABI for TVMs

From: Xing, Cedric
Date: Fri Sep 13 2024 - 15:43:09 EST


On 9/12/2024 5:03 AM, Christophe de Dinechin wrote:


On 10 Sep 2024, at 19:09, Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Hi Cedric,

On Sat, Sep 07, 2024 at 11:56:18PM -0500, Cedric Xing wrote:
Patch 2 introduces event log support for RTMRs, addressing the fact that the
standalone values of RTMRs, which represent the cumulative digests of
sequential events, are not fully informative on their own.

Would each event_log include the events that firmware wrote before Linux?
I'm wondering how this coexists with /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/CCEL.
Maybe something like: CCEL only contains pre-Linux events. The TSM driver
parses CCEL (using a format specific to the arch, for example TCG2),
separates the events by MR and produces event_log files in
/sys/kernel/tsm/, possibly in a different format like CEL-TLV. Is that
what you envision for TDX?

I ask because I've been looking into this interface for Arm CCA, and
having unified event logs available somewhere in /sys/kernel/confg/tsm
would be very convenient for users (avoids having to parse and convert
different /sys/firmware interfaces along with Linux event logs). I would
have put a single event_log in /sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/ but
splitting it by MR should work too.

As Alex I believe we need more similarity between the interfaces of static
and runtime measurements, because verifiers may benefit from an event log
of static measurements. For example Arm could have a configuration like
this:

struct tsm_measurement_register arm_cca_mrs[] = {
{ MR_(rim) | TSM_MR_F_R | TSM_MR_F_LOG, HA },
{ MR_(rem0) | TSM_MR_F_R | TSM_MR_F_X | TSM_MR_F_LOG, HA },
...
{ MR_(rem3) | TSM_MR_F_R | TSM_MR_F_X | TSM_MR_F_LOG, HA },
};

Here rim is a static measurement of the initial VM state, impossible to
extend but could have an event log. rem0-3 are runtime measurements,
extensible by firmware and then Linux. None of the digests can be written
directly, only extended and read with calls to the upper layer. The tree
would be:

/sys/kernel/config/tsm/
├── rim
│ ├── digest
│ ├── event_log
│ └── hash_algo
├── rem0
│ ├── digest
│ ├── append_event
│ ├── event_log
│ └── hash_algo
...
├── rem3
│ ├── digest
│ ├── append_event
│ ├── event_log
│ └── hash_algo
└── report/$name
├── inblob
└── outblob

It’s nice to have a similar structure between ARM and x86, but how does
user space know what each register holds? For example, say that I want
a digest of the initial VM state, of the boot configuration, of the
command line, or of the firmware, where do I get that? When using a TPM,
there are conventions on which PCR stores which particular piece of
information.
> Is the idea to defer that to user space, or should we also have some
symlinks exposing this or that specific register when it exists under
a common, platform-agnostic name? e.g. on ARM you would have

/sys/kernel/config/tsm/initial_vm_state -> ./rim
On the surface, a convention + symlinks could be a solution to the problem.

But if we dig deeper, a conventions will be difficult to establish because different users/tenants/applications have different needs in passing configurations/policies (or additional whatever). A more generic model is to allow upper layer software to specify arbitrary number of measurements in the form of name/value pairs. For example, say `rim` is the only static MR on Arm but the tenant wants to pass in a policy file along with the tenant's public key. We could put the following 2 lines into rim's log (more like a manifest because the MR is static):

kernel.org/tsm/static_mr mr_policy <policy digest>
kernel.org/tsm/static_mr mr_pubkey <public key digest>

Then, assuming Arm CCA guest driver also understands the log format above, it would create 2 virtual/pseudo-MRs, namely `mr_policy` and `mr_pubkey`, to expose those digests to applications.

Then say, if the tenant wants the same application to run on Intel TDX, whose MRTD doesn't support the same semantics as rim, MROWNERCONFIG could be used instead - the same log entries but for MROWNERCONFIG this time. The TDX guest would then create the same `mr_policy` and `mr_pubkey` for those same applications to consume. Please note that those applications are CC arch agnostic (at source level).

During attestation/verification, the verifier is supposed to consist of a buttom (CC arch specific) layer and a top (CC arch agnostic) layer. The bottom would verify the integrity of the log using different MRs (rim on Arm CCA or MROWNERCONFIG on Intel TDX), then the top layer would extract and verify `mr_policy`/`mr_pubkey` against the reference values set forth by the tenant.

It looks to me like this could simplify the writing of user-space
attestation agents, for example. But then, maybe I’m too optimistic
and such agents would always be platform-dependent anyway.

I believe portable (CC arch agnostic) applications can be done, but there's still some way to go.

-Cedric