Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] x86/fred: Clear the WFE bit in missing-ENDBRANCH #CP

[Xin Li]

On 9/11/2024 4:35 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 12/09/2024 12:19 am, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> > The WFE, i.e., WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH, bit in the augmented CS of FRED
> > stack frame is set to 1 in missing-ENDBRANCH #CP exceptions.
> >
> > The CPU will generate another missing-ENDBRANCH #CP if the WFE bit
> > is left as 1, because the indirect branch tracker will be set in
> > the WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH state upon completion of the following ERETS
> > instruction and the CPU will restart from the IP that just caused a
> > previous missing-ENDBRANCH #CP.
> >
> > Clear the WFE bit to avoid dead looping in missing-ENDBRANCH #CP.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> Ah - good.  Finally some evidence that this hole in CET has been plugged
> by FRED.
>
> However, I'd suggest describing it differently.
>
>
> By definition, all missing-ENDBRANCH #CPs are a result of WFE && !ENDBR.
>
> But, in original CET under IDT delivery, any transfer for
> interrupt/exception/etc that does not change privilege will clobber the
> WFE state because MSR_{U,S}_CET.WFE is intentionally set by microcode so
> as to expect to find an ENDBR at the interrupt/exception/syscall entrypoint.
>
> In practice, this means interrupts and exceptions hitting the kernel, or
> user interrupts, loose the WFE state of the interrupted context.  And

loose -> lose?

    Xin

> yes, this means that a well timed interrupt (to the precise instruction
> boundary) will let an attacker sneak a bad function pointer past the
> CET-IBT enforcement.
>
> In FRED, the WFE state of the interrupted context (even if it is the
> same privilege) is preserved and restored, in order to close this hole.
>
> Therefore, the intentional #CP selfchecks need to clear WFE when they
> are deemed to have succeeded, now that FRED is causing the state not to
> get lost.
>
> ~Andrew