Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mseal: update mseal.rst

[Jeff Xu]

Hi Theo

On Fri, Oct 4, 2024 at 6:04 PM Theo de Raadt <deraadt@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > On 10/4/24 9:52 AM, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > >> above is not a sentence but I don't know how to fix it.
> > >>
> > > Would below work ?
> > >
> > > Certain destructive madvise behaviors, specifically MADV_DONTNEED,
> > > MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK,
> > > MADV_WIPEONFORK, can pose risks when applied to anonymous memory by
> > > threads without write permissions. These behaviors have the potential
> > > to modify region contents by discarding pages, effectively performing
> > > a memset(0) operation on the anonymous memory.
> >
> > Yes, that works.
> > Or at least it explains the problem, like Theo said.
>
> In OpenBSD, mimmutable() solves this problem (in later code iterations).
>
> In Linux, does mseal() solve the problem or not?  The statement doesn't
> answer this question.  It only explains the problem.
>
> If it doesn't solve the problem, that's pretty surprising (weaker than
> mimmutable).
>
> During development I wrote a fake little program which placed an 'int =
> 1' resided into a zone of readonly memory (.data), and then imagined "an
> attacker gets enough control to perform an madvise(), but only had
> enough control, and has to return to normal control flow immediately".
> The madvise() operations was able to trash the int, altering the
> program's later behaviour.  So I researched the matter more, and adapted
> mimmutable() to block ALL system-call variations similar to 'write to a
> not-permitted region'.
>
> So the question remains:  Does mseal() block such a (rare) pattern or not.

Apology  for delay.
Yes, mseal does block such patterns.

Thanks
-Jeff

> The sentence doesn't indicate that mseal() has a response to the stated
> problem.
>