[PATCH RFC] ubifs: Fix use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit

From: Waqar Hameed
Date: Thu Oct 10 2024 - 10:53:27 EST


Running

rm -f /etc/test-file.bin
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/etc/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync

in a loop, with `CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION`, KASAN reports:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
Write of size 32 at addr ffffff800a3af86c by task ubifs_bgt0_20/153

Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x340
show_stack+0x18/0x24
dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xbc
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b0
kasan_report+0x1d8/0x1f0
kasan_check_range+0xf8/0x1a0
memcpy+0x84/0xf4
ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
do_commit+0x4e0/0x1340
ubifs_bg_thread+0x234/0x2e0
kthread+0x36c/0x410
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Allocated by task 401:
kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8c/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x34c/0x5bc
tnc_insert+0x140/0x16a4
ubifs_tnc_add+0x370/0x52c
ubifs_jnl_write_data+0x5d8/0x870
do_writepage+0x36c/0x510
ubifs_writepage+0x190/0x4dc
__writepage+0x58/0x154
write_cache_pages+0x394/0x830
do_writepages+0x1f0/0x5b0
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x170/0x25c
file_write_and_wait_range+0x140/0x190
ubifs_fsync+0xe8/0x290
vfs_fsync_range+0xc0/0x1e4
do_fsync+0x40/0x90
__arm64_sys_fsync+0x34/0x50
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
el0_svc+0x34/0x70
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8

Freed by task 403:
kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40
kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
__kasan_slab_free+0xd4/0x13c
kfree+0xc4/0x3a0
tnc_delete+0x3f4/0xe40
ubifs_tnc_remove_range+0x368/0x73c
ubifs_tnc_remove_ino+0x29c/0x2e0
ubifs_jnl_delete_inode+0x150/0x260
ubifs_evict_inode+0x1d4/0x2e4
evict+0x1c8/0x450
iput+0x2a0/0x3c4
do_unlinkat+0x2cc/0x490
__arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x90/0x100
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
el0_svc+0x34/0x70
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8

The offending `memcpy` is in `ubifs_copy_hash()`. Fix this by checking
if the `znode` is obsolete before accessing the hash (just like we do
for `znode->parent`).

Fixes: 16a26b20d2af ("ubifs: authentication: Add hashes to index nodes")
Signed-off-by: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@xxxxxxxx>
---
I'm not entirely sure if this is the _correct_ way to fix this. However,
testing shows that the problem indeed disappears.

My understanding is that the `znode` could concurrently be deleted (with
a reference in an unprotected code section without `tnc_mutex`). The
assumption is that in this case it would be sufficient to check
`ubifs_zn_obsolete(znode)`, like as in the if-statement for
`znode->parent` just below.

I'll be happy to get any helpful feedback!

fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c b/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c
index a55e04822d16..0b358254272b 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c
@@ -891,8 +891,10 @@ static int write_index(struct ubifs_info *c)
mutex_lock(&c->tnc_mutex);

if (znode->cparent)
- ubifs_copy_hash(c, hash,
- znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->ciip].hash);
+ if (!ubifs_zn_obsolete(znode))
+ ubifs_copy_hash(c, hash,
+ znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->ciip]
+ .hash);

if (znode->parent) {
if (!ubifs_zn_obsolete(znode))
--
2.39.2