Re: [PATCH net] can: can327: fix snprintf() limit in can327_handle_prompt()

[Vincent Mailhol]

On 14/11/2024 at 18:57, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 06:34:49PM +0900, Vincent Mailhol wrote:
> > Hi Dan,
> >
> > On 14/11/2024 at 18:03, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > > This code is printing hex values to the &local_txbuf buffer and it's
> > > using the snprintf() function to try prevent buffer overflows.  The
> > > problem is that it's not passing the correct limit to the snprintf()
> > > function so the limit doesn't do anything.  On each iteration we print
> > > two digits so the remaining size should also decrease by two, but
> > > instead it passes the sizeof() the entire buffer each time.
> > >
> > > If the frame->len were too long it would result in a buffer overflow.
> >
> > But, can frame->len be too long? Classical CAN frame maximum length is 8
> > bytes. And I do not see a path for a malformed frame to reach this part of
> > the driver.
> >
> > If such a path exists, I think this should be explained. Else, I am just not
> > sure if this needs a Fixes: tag.

I confirmed the CAN frame length is correctly checked.

The only way to trigger that snprintf() with the wrong size is if 
CAN327_TX_DO_CAN_DATA is set, which only occurs in can327_send_frame(). 
And the only caller of can327_send_frame() is can327_netdev_start_xmit().

can327_netdev_start_xmit() calls can_dev_dropped_skb() which in turn 
calls can_dropped_invalid_skb() which goes to can_is_can_skb() which 
finally checks that cf->len is not bigger than CAN_MAX_DLEN (i.e. 8 bytes).

So indeed, no buffer overflow can occur here.

> Even when bugs don't affect runtime we still assign a Fixes tag, but we don't
> CC stable.  There is no way that passing the wrong size was intentional.

Got it. Thanks for the explanation, now it makes sense to keep the 
Fixes: tag.


Yours sincerely,
Vincent Mailhol