Re: [PATCH 2/4] mm: security: Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time
From: Kees Cook
Date: Wed Jan 22 2025 - 19:57:58 EST
On Wed, Jan 22, 2025 at 05:19:23PM +0000, Mel Gorman wrote:
> HARDENED_USERCOPY defaults to on if enabled at compile time. Allow
> hardened_usercopy= default to be set at compile time similar to
> init_on_alloc= and init_on_free=. The intent is that hardening
> options that can be disabled at runtime can set their default at
> build time.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +++-
> mm/usercopy.c | 3 ++-
> security/Kconfig.hardening | 8 ++++++++
> 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 3872bc6ec49d..5d759b20540a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -1773,7 +1773,9 @@
> allocation boundaries as a proactive defense
> against bounds-checking flaws in the kernel's
> copy_to_user()/copy_from_user() interface.
> - on Perform hardened usercopy checks (default).
> + The default is determined by
> + CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON.
> + on Perform hardened usercopy checks.
> off Disable hardened usercopy checks.
>
> hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace=
> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> index 83c164aba6e0..4cf33305347a 100644
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
>
> -static bool enable_checks __initdata = true;
> +static bool enable_checks __initdata =
> + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON);
>
> static int __init parse_hardened_usercopy(char *str)
> {
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> index 9088d613d519..adcc260839c7 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> @@ -293,6 +293,14 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
> or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
> of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
>
> +config HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON
> + bool "Harden memory copies by default"
> + depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
> + default n
This must be "default HARDENED_USERCOPY" or existing distro builds will
break. All major distros enable this by default, and I don't want to
risk HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON getting missed and getting globally
disabled.
> + help
> + This has the effect of setting "hardened_usercopy=on" on the kernel
> + command line. This can be disabled with "hardened_usercopy=off".
> +
> endmenu
>
> menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"
-Kees
--
Kees Cook