Re: [PATCH v2] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering

[Kees Cook]

On Thu, Jan 30, 2025 at 07:05:42AM -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
> So if we go with the suggestion above, we'll support the theoretical
> __NR_uretprobe_32 for filtered seccomp, but not for strict seccomp, and
> that's ok because strict seccomp is less common?

It's so uncommon I regularly consider removing it entirely. :)

> Personally I'd prefer to limit the scope of this fix to the problem we
> are aware of, and not possible problems should someone decide to reimplement
> uretprobes on different archs in a different way. Especially as this fix needs
> to be backmerged to stable kernels.
> So my personal preference would be to avoid __NR_uretprobe_32 in this patch
> and deal with it if it ever gets implemented.

That's fine, but I want the exception to be designed to fail closed
instead of failing open. I think my proposed future-proof check does
this.

-- 
Kees Cook