Re: [PATCH 2/3] KVM: x86: Add support for VMware guest specific hypercalls
From: Doug Covelli
Date: Mon Feb 03 2025 - 13:36:02 EST
On Mon, Feb 3, 2025 at 1:22 PM Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Feb 3, 2025 at 5:35 PM Doug Covelli <doug.covelli@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > OK. It seems like fully embracing the in-kernel APIC is the way to go
> > especially considering it really simplifies using KVM's support for nested
> > virtualization. Speaking of nested virtualization we have been working on
> > adding support for that and would like to propose a couple of changes:
> >
> > - Add an option for L0 to handle backdoor accesses from CPL3 code running in L2.
> > On a #GP nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit can check if this option is enabled and KVM
> > can handle the #GP like it would if it had been from L1 (exit to userlevel iff
> > it is a backdoor access otherwwise deliver the fault to L2). When combined with
> > enable_vmware_backdoor this will allow L0 to optionally handle backdoor accesses
> > from CPL3 code running in L2. This is needed for cases such as running VMware
> > tools in a Windows VM with VBS enabled. For other cases such as running tools
> > in a Windows VM in an ESX VM we still want L1 to handle the backdoor accesses
> > from L2.
>
> I think this makes sense and could be an argument to KVM_ENABLE_CAP.
>
> > - Extend KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT for permission faults (e.g the guest attempting
> > to write to a page that has been protected by userlevel calling mprotect). This
> > is useful for cases where we want synchronous detection of guest writes such as
> > lazy snapshots (dirty page tracking is no good for this case). Currently
> > permission faults result in KVM_RUN returning EFAULT which we handle by
> > interpreting the instruction as we do not know the guest physical address
> > associated with the fault.
>
> Yes, this makes sense too, though you might want to look into
> userfaultfd as well.
>
> We had something planned using attributes, but I don't see any issue
> extending it to EFAULT. Maybe it would have to be yet another
> KVM_ENABLE_CAP; considering that it would break your existing code,
> there might be someone else in the wild doing it.
It looks like KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT was implemented in such a way that it
won't break existing code:
Note! KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT is unique among all KVM exit reasons in
that it accompanies a return code of ‘-1’, not ‘0’! errno will always
be set to EFAULT or EHWPOISON when KVM exits with
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT, userspace should assume kvm_run.exit_reason is
stale/undefined for all other error numbers.
That being said we could certainly make this opt-in if that is preferable.
Doug
> Paolo
>
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