Re: [PATCH v3 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation

[Josh Poimboeuf]

On Wed, Jan 08, 2025 at 02:24:52PM -0600, David Kaplan wrote:
> @@ -1254,27 +1269,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
>  	    (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
>  		cpu_smt_disable(false);
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
> -	 * retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing
> -	 */
> -	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
> -		switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
> -		case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
> -			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
> -			break;
> -		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
> -		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
> -		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
> -			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
> -			break;
> -		default:
> -			if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF)
> -				pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
> -		}
> -	}
> -
> -	pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
>  }

Extra whitespace at end of function.

-- 
Josh