[PATCH 2/6] x86/mm: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB checks in cond_mitigation()

From: Yosry Ahmed
Date: Wed Feb 19 2025 - 17:10:02 EST


The check is performed when either switch_mm_cond_ibpb or
switch_mm_always_ibpb is set. In both cases, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is
always set. Remove the redundant check.

Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@xxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index be0c1a509869c..e860fc8edfae4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -437,8 +437,7 @@ static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next)
* both have the IBPB bit set.
*/
if (next_mm != prev_mm &&
- (next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB &&
- cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB))
+ (next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}

@@ -448,8 +447,7 @@ static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next)
* different context than the user space task which ran
* last on this CPU.
*/
- if ((prev_mm & ~LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK) != (unsigned long)next->mm &&
- cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB))
+ if ((prev_mm & ~LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK) != (unsigned long)next->mm)
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}

--
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog