[PATCH next 1/3] iov: Remove access_ok() from import_iovec()

[David Laight]

There is no point checking the validity of the user address when reading
the iovec[] from usespace.
It is checked again before the user copy itself.
Added in 09fc68dc66f75 (iov_iter: saner checks on copyin/copyout)

Signed-off-by: David Laight <david.laight.linux@xxxxxxxxx>
---
 lib/iov_iter.c | 9 ---------
 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
index 65f550cb5081..623ec43e049a 100644
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c
+++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -1471,13 +1471,6 @@ ssize_t __import_iovec(int type, const struct iovec __user *uvec,
 	for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {
 		ssize_t len = (ssize_t)iov[seg].iov_len;
 
-		if (!access_ok(iov[seg].iov_base, len)) {
-			if (iov != *iovp)
-				kfree(iov);
-			*iovp = NULL;
-			return -EFAULT;
-		}
-
 		if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT - total_len) {
 			len = MAX_RW_COUNT - total_len;
 			iov[seg].iov_len = len;
@@ -1528,8 +1521,6 @@ int import_ubuf(int rw, void __user *buf, size_t len, struct iov_iter *i)
 {
 	if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT)
 		len = MAX_RW_COUNT;
-	if (unlikely(!access_ok(buf, len)))
-		return -EFAULT;
 
 	iov_iter_ubuf(i, rw, buf, len);
 	return 0;
-- 
2.39.5