Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/sgx: Implement EUPDATESVN and opportunistically call it during first EPC page alloc

From: Jarkko Sakkinen
Date: Fri Mar 28 2025 - 14:07:04 EST


On Fri, Mar 28, 2025 at 07:50:43PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 28, 2025 at 02:57:41PM +0200, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> > SGX architecture introduced a new instruction called EUPDATESVN
> > to Ice Lake. It allows updating security SVN version, given that EPC
> > is completely empty. The latter is required for security reasons
> > in order to reason that enclave security posture is as secure as the
> > security SVN version of the TCB that created it.
> >
> > Additionally it is important to ensure that while ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
> > runs, no concurrent page creation happens in EPC, because it might
> > result in #GP delivered to the creator. Legacy SW might not be prepared
> > to handle such unexpected #GPs and therefore this patch introduces
> > a locking mechanism to ensure no concurrent EPC allocations can happen.
> >
> > It is also ensured that ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] is not called when running
> > in a VM since it does not have a meaning in this context (microcode
> > updates application is limited to the host OS) and will create
> > unnecessary load.
> >
> > This patch is based on previous submision by Cathy Zhang
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220520103904.1216-1-cathy.zhang@xxxxxxxxx/
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@xxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 41 +++++++++++++--------
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 +
> > 4 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
> > index 6a0069761508..5caf5c31ebc6 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
> > @@ -26,23 +26,26 @@
> > #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION 0x1
> > /* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */
> > #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK GENMASK(3, 0)
> > +/* EUPDATESVN presence indication */
> > +#define SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN BIT(10)
> >
> > enum sgx_encls_function {
> > - ECREATE = 0x00,
> > - EADD = 0x01,
> > - EINIT = 0x02,
> > - EREMOVE = 0x03,
> > - EDGBRD = 0x04,
> > - EDGBWR = 0x05,
> > - EEXTEND = 0x06,
> > - ELDU = 0x08,
> > - EBLOCK = 0x09,
> > - EPA = 0x0A,
> > - EWB = 0x0B,
> > - ETRACK = 0x0C,
> > - EAUG = 0x0D,
> > - EMODPR = 0x0E,
> > - EMODT = 0x0F,
> > + ECREATE = 0x00,
> > + EADD = 0x01,
> > + EINIT = 0x02,
> > + EREMOVE = 0x03,
> > + EDGBRD = 0x04,
> > + EDGBWR = 0x05,
> > + EEXTEND = 0x06,
> > + ELDU = 0x08,
> > + EBLOCK = 0x09,
> > + EPA = 0x0A,
> > + EWB = 0x0B,
> > + ETRACK = 0x0C,
> > + EAUG = 0x0D,
> > + EMODPR = 0x0E,
> > + EMODT = 0x0F,
> > + EUPDATESVN = 0x18,
> > };
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -73,6 +76,11 @@ enum sgx_encls_function {
> > * public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH.
> > * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE: The EPC page cannot be modified because it
> > * is in the PENDING or MODIFIED state.
> > + * %SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: Insufficient entropy in RNG.
> > + * %SGX_EPC_NOT_READY: EPC is not ready for SVN update.
> > + * %SGX_NO_UPDATE: EUPDATESVN was successful, but CPUSVN was not
> > + * updated because current SVN was not newer than
> > + * CPUSVN.
> > * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received
> > */
> > enum sgx_return_code {
> > @@ -81,6 +89,9 @@ enum sgx_return_code {
> > SGX_CHILD_PRESENT = 13,
> > SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN = 16,
> > SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE = 20,
> > + SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY = 29,
> > + SGX_EPC_NOT_READY = 30,
> > + SGX_NO_UPDATE = 31,
> > SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128,
> > };
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
> > index 99004b02e2ed..3d83c76dc91f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
> > @@ -233,4 +233,10 @@ static inline int __eaug(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
> > return __encls_2(EAUG, pginfo, addr);
> > }
> >
> > +/* Update CPUSVN at runtime. */
> > +static inline int __eupdatesvn(void)
> > +{
> > + return __encls_ret_1(EUPDATESVN, "");
> > +}
> > +
> > #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> > index b61d3bad0446..24563110811d 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> > @@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ static DEFINE_XARRAY(sgx_epc_address_space);
> > static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list);
> > static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_reclaimer_lock);
> >
> > +/* This lock is held to prevent new EPC pages from being created
> > + * during the execution of ENCLS[EUPDATESVN].
> > + */
> > +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> > +
> > static atomic_long_t sgx_nr_used_pages = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
> > static unsigned long sgx_nr_total_pages;
> >
> > @@ -457,7 +462,17 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_node(int nid)
> > page->flags = 0;
> >
> > spin_unlock(&node->lock);
> > - atomic_long_inc(&sgx_nr_used_pages);
> > +
> > + if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&sgx_nr_used_pages)) {
> > + spin_lock(&sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> > + /* Only call sgx_updatesvn() once the first enclave's
> > + * page is allocated from EPC
> > + */
> > + if (atomic_long_read(&sgx_nr_used_pages) == 0)
> > + sgx_updatesvn();
> > + atomic_long_inc(&sgx_nr_used_pages);
> > + spin_unlock(&sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> > + }
> >
> > return page;
> > }
> > @@ -970,3 +985,49 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void)
> > }
> >
> > device_initcall(sgx_init);
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * sgx_updatesvn() - Issue ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
> > + * If EPC is ready, this instruction will update CPUSVN to the currently
> > + * loaded microcode update SVN and generate new cryptographic assets.
> > + */
> > +void sgx_updatesvn(void)
> > +{
> > + int retry = 10;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + lockdep_assert_held(&sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> > +
> > + if (!(cpuid_eax(SGX_CPUID) & SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + /* Do not execute ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] if running in a VM since
> > + * microcode updates are only meaningful to be applied on the host.
> > + */
> > + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + do {
> > + ret = __eupdatesvn();
> > + if (ret != SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + } while (--retry);
> > +
> > + switch (ret) {
> > + case 0:
> > + pr_info("EUPDATESVN: success\n");
> > + break;
> > + case SGX_EPC_NOT_READY:
> > + case SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY:
> > + case SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT:
> > + pr_err("EUPDATESVN: error %d\n", ret);
> > + break;
> > + case SGX_NO_UPDATE:
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + pr_err("EUPDATESVN: unknown error %d\n", ret);
> > + break;
> > + }
>
> Overall, I think you're right in that "inversion" does make sense,
> now that other stuff is better aligned.
>
> At least when there is spurious error, I think ioctl's should stop
> responding and driver should not do anything useful anymore. I.e.,
> it should go out-of-service.
>
> I don't think the driver should tear-down, just stop servicing
> VM's and responding ioctl's.
>
> Possibly thish should be also right action for other errors than
> "insufficient entropy" but I'm open for comments for this.

Or actually actually I take one step back with my suggestions
because this really should be a question for which I don't have
the definitive answer.

The current code works like this: if anything that we don't
like happens, we re-iterate.

Should some of the "exceptional conditions" have a different
recovery or not?

BR, Jarkko