[PATCH v3 2/7] x86/asm: Make rip_rel_ptr() usable from fPIC code

From: Ard Biesheuvel
Date: Tue Apr 08 2025 - 04:58:53 EST


From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>

RIP_REL_REF() is used in non-PIC C code that is called very early,
before the kernel virtual mapping is up, which is the mapping that the
linker expects. It is currently used in two different ways:
- to refer to the value of a global variable, including as an lvalue in
assignments;
- to take the address of a global variable via the mapping that the code
currently executes at.

The former case is only needed in non-PIC code, as PIC code will never
use absolute symbol references when the address of the symbol is not
being used. But taking the address of a variable in PIC code may still
require extra care, as a stack allocated struct assignment may be
emitted as a memcpy() from a statically allocated copy in .rodata.

For instance, this

void startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void)
{
struct desc_ptr startup_gdt_descr = {
.address = (__force unsigned long)gdt_page.gdt,
.size = GDT_SIZE - 1,
};

may result in an absolute symbol reference in PIC code, even though the
struct is allocated on the stack and populated at runtime.

To address this case, make rip_rel_ptr() accessible in PIC code, and
update any existing uses where the address of a global variable is
taken using RIP_REL_REF.

Once all code of this nature has been moved into arch/x86/boot/startup
and built with -fPIC, RIP_REL_REF() can be retired, and only
rip_rel_ptr() will remain.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 23 ++++++++++----------
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 6 ++---
5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index b0c1a7a57497..832f7a7b10b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ static __head void svsm_setup(struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
* kernel was loaded (physbase), so the get the CA address using
* RIP-relative addressing.
*/
- pa = (u64)&RIP_REL_REF(boot_svsm_ca_page);
+ pa = (u64)rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page);

/*
* Switch over to the boot SVSM CA while the current CA is still
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
index 2e4122f8aa6b..04982d356803 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid
*/
static const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table(void)
{
- return &RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_table_copy);
+ return rip_rel_ptr(&cpuid_table_copy);
}

/*
@@ -1681,7 +1681,7 @@ static bool __head svsm_setup_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
* routine is running identity mapped when called, both by the decompressor
* code and the early kernel code.
*/
- if (!rmpadjust((unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(boot_ghcb_page), RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
+ if (!rmpadjust((unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(&boot_ghcb_page), RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
return false;

/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
index cc2881576c2c..a9f07799e337 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h
@@ -114,13 +114,13 @@
#endif

#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
-#ifndef __pic__
static __always_inline __pure void *rip_rel_ptr(void *p)
{
asm("leaq %c1(%%rip), %0" : "=r"(p) : "i"(p));

return p;
}
+#ifndef __pic__
#define RIP_REL_REF(var) (*(typeof(&(var)))rip_rel_ptr(&(var)))
#else
#define RIP_REL_REF(var) (var)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index fa9b6339975f..3fb23d805cef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
* attribute.
*/
if (sme_get_me_mask()) {
- paddr = (unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(__start_bss_decrypted);
- paddr_end = (unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(__end_bss_decrypted);
+ paddr = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(__start_bss_decrypted);
+ paddr_end = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(__end_bss_decrypted);

for (; paddr < paddr_end; paddr += PMD_SIZE) {
/*
@@ -144,8 +144,8 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
struct boot_params *bp)
{
- pmd_t (*early_pgts)[PTRS_PER_PMD] = RIP_REL_REF(early_dynamic_pgts);
- unsigned long physaddr = (unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(_text);
+ pmd_t (*early_pgts)[PTRS_PER_PMD] = rip_rel_ptr(early_dynamic_pgts);
+ unsigned long physaddr = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_text);
unsigned long va_text, va_end;
unsigned long pgtable_flags;
unsigned long load_delta;
@@ -174,18 +174,18 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
for (;;);

va_text = physaddr - p2v_offset;
- va_end = (unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(_end) - p2v_offset;
+ va_end = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_end) - p2v_offset;

/* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();

/* Fixup the physical addresses in the page table */

- pgd = &RIP_REL_REF(early_top_pgt)->pgd;
+ pgd = rip_rel_ptr(early_top_pgt);
pgd[pgd_index(__START_KERNEL_map)] += load_delta;

if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL) && la57) {
- p4d = (p4dval_t *)&RIP_REL_REF(level4_kernel_pgt);
+ p4d = (p4dval_t *)rip_rel_ptr(level4_kernel_pgt);
p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D - 1] += load_delta;

pgd[pgd_index(__START_KERNEL_map)] = (pgdval_t)p4d | _PAGE_TABLE;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
* error, causing the BIOS to halt the system.
*/

- pmd = &RIP_REL_REF(level2_kernel_pgt)->pmd;
+ pmd = rip_rel_ptr(level2_kernel_pgt);

/* invalidate pages before the kernel image */
for (i = 0; i < pmd_index(va_text); i++)
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static gate_desc bringup_idt_table[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS] __page_aligned_data;
static void __head startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler)
{
struct desc_ptr desc = {
- .address = (unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(bringup_idt_table),
+ .address = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(bringup_idt_table),
.size = sizeof(bringup_idt_table) - 1,
};
struct idt_data data;
@@ -565,11 +565,10 @@ void early_setup_idt(void)
*/
void __head startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void)
{
- struct desc_struct *gdt = (void *)(__force unsigned long)gdt_page.gdt;
void *handler = NULL;

struct desc_ptr startup_gdt_descr = {
- .address = (unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(*gdt),
+ .address = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr((__force void *)&gdt_page),
.size = GDT_SIZE - 1,
};

@@ -582,7 +581,7 @@ void __head startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void)
"movl %%eax, %%es\n" : : "a"(__KERNEL_DS) : "memory");

if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT))
- handler = &RIP_REL_REF(vc_no_ghcb);
+ handler = rip_rel_ptr(vc_no_ghcb);

startup_64_load_idt(handler);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 5eecdd92da10..e7fb3779b35f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -318,8 +318,8 @@ void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
* memory from being cached.
*/

- kernel_start = (unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(_text);
- kernel_end = ALIGN((unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(_end), PMD_SIZE);
+ kernel_start = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_text);
+ kernel_end = ALIGN((unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_end), PMD_SIZE);
kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;

initrd_start = 0;
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
* pagetable structures for the encryption of the kernel
* pagetable structures for workarea (in case not currently mapped)
*/
- execute_start = workarea_start = (unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(sme_workarea);
+ execute_start = workarea_start = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(sme_workarea);
execute_end = execute_start + (PAGE_SIZE * 2) + PMD_SIZE;
execute_len = execute_end - execute_start;

--
2.49.0.504.g3bcea36a83-goog