Re: [PATCH v2] PCI: Check rom header and data structure addr before accessing

From: Guixin Liu

Date: Wed Nov 19 2025 - 07:50:46 EST




在 2025/11/19 18:49, Andy Shevchenko 写道:
On Wed, Nov 19, 2025 at 06:11:16PM +0800, Guixin Liu wrote:

Thanks for the update, my comments below.

We meet a crash when running stress-ng:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffa0000007f40000
RIP: 0010:pci_get_rom_size+0x52/0x220
Call Trace:
<TASK>

pci_map_rom+0x80/0x130
pci_read_rom+0x4b/0xe0
kernfs_file_read_iter+0x96/0x180
vfs_read+0x1b1/0x300
ksys_read+0x63/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
You missed my comment on these lines. Have you read Submitting Patches
documentation?
oh, 4 lines, of coures, will be updated in v3.

Our analysis reveals that the rom space's start address is
0xffa0000007f30000, and size is 0x10000. Because of broken rom
space, before calling readl(pds), the pds's value is
0xffa0000007f3ffff, which is already pointed to the rom space
end, invoking readl() would read 4 bytes therefore cause an
out-of-bounds access and trigger a crash.

Fix this by adding image header and data structure checking.
...

static size_t pci_get_rom_size(struct pci_dev *pdev, void __iomem *rom,
size_t size)
{
+ void __iomem *end = rom + size;
void __iomem *image;
int last_image;
unsigned int length;
image = rom;
do {
void __iomem *pds;
+
+ if (image + PCI_ROM_HEADER_SIZE >= end)
+ break;
+
/* Standard PCI ROMs start out with these bytes 55 AA */
if (readw(image) != 0xAA55) {
pci_info(pdev, "Invalid PCI ROM header signature: expecting 0xaa55, got %#06x\n",
readw(image));
break;
}
+
/* get the PCI data structure and check its "PCIR" signature */
pds = image + readw(image + 24);
+ if (pds + PCI_ROM_DATA_STRUCT_SIZE >= end)
+ break;
if (readl(pds) != 0x52494350) {
pci_info(pdev, "Invalid PCI ROM data signature: expecting 0x52494350, got %#010x\n",
readl(pds));
last_image = readb(pds + 21) & 0x80;
length = readw(pds + 16);
image += length * 512;
+
/* Avoid iterating through memory outside the resource window */
- if (image >= rom + size)
+ if (image + PCI_ROM_HEADER_SIZE >= end)
Theoretically this can overflow and become a false condition when should be
true. Check overflow.h if they have some helpers for wraparound checks.
Yes, this can overflow, will be changed in v3.
So, first you need to validate the "end" and/or "size".

image = rom;
do {
void __iomem *pds;

if (size < PCI_ROM_HEADER_SIZE)
break;
...
size -= ... // not sure if we can change this variable, though
} while (...);
Sure, I will modify the code to fix the overflow issue.

Best Regards,
Guixin Liu

break;
if (!last_image) {
if (readw(image) != 0xAA55) {