Re: [RESEND PATCH bpf-next v4 7/9] bpf: Add common attr support for map_create
From: Alexei Starovoitov
Date: Wed Jan 07 2026 - 01:20:36 EST
On Tue, Jan 6, 2026 at 9:57 PM Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/1/26 01:44, bot+bpf-ci@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> >> index 14fc5738f2b9..e64cc7504731 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> >
> > [ ... ]
> >
> >> @@ -6279,7 +6345,11 @@ static int __sys_bpf(enum bpf_cmd cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size,
> >>
> >> switch (cmd) {
> >> case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
> >> - err = map_create(&attr, uattr);
> >> + common_attrs.log_true_size = 0;
> >> + err = map_create(&attr, uattr, &common_attrs);
> >> + ret = copy_common_attr_log_true_size(uattr_common, size_common,
> >> + &common_attrs.log_true_size);
> >> + err = ret ? ret : err;
> >
> > When map_create() succeeds, it returns a file descriptor that is already
> > installed in the caller's fd table via bpf_map_new_fd(). If
> > copy_common_attr_log_true_size() then fails (e.g., user provided a
> > read-only buffer for uattr_common), the syscall returns -EFAULT but the
> > fd remains installed.
> >
> > Could this leak the file descriptor? The user gets an error and has no
> > way to know what fd number was allocated, so they cannot close it.
> >
>
> Good catch — you’re right.
>
> If 'map_create()' succeeds and 'copy_common_attr_log_true_size()' later
> fails (e.g. returning -EFAULT), the newly created file descriptor would
> remain installed and could be leaked.
>
> I’ll fix this in the next revision by explicitly closing the fd when
> ret is non-zero.
No. The refactoring was wrong. Don't make the kernel do extra work.
Patch 3 introduced a bug and closing fd is not a solution.
Such a pattern can be exploited for DoS.